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ABSTRACT
Road traffic injuries are a growing health epidemic with fatalities and injuries marking damaging
emotional, social, and economic impacts on humans, countries and the world. In response, the United
Nations proclaimed a decade of action for road safety (2011-2020) to call upon governments across the
world to act towards reducing the number of the rising global road traffic fatalities and injuries. The
UN introduced a conceptual framework consisting of five pillars (1) road safety management; (2)
safer roads and mobility; (3) safer vehicles; (4) safer road users; and (5) post-crash response.
Unfortunately, Egypt did not commit to the UN’s resolution although the country faces a serious road
safety problem. Very little research has been done on road safety in Egypt, and the country lacks a
coherent road safety policy with a clear strategy, defined objectives and measurable targets. Moreover,
this study found various discrepancies in Egypt’s crash data upon examining different reports and
publications. To understand the underlying issues of Egypt’s poor road safety conditions, a key research
question was examined: what are the road safety challenges in Egypt? The results show that Egypt faces
deeply rooted problems when it comes to road safety management. For example, the country does not
have enough police officers available to enforce the road traffic laws, nor does it have a proper
automated system to address the shortage. In addition, the absence of a road safety lead agency with a
legal mandate has resulted in the lack of accountability and disorganization of government stakeholders.
The failure in the road safety management pillar has caused a domino effect in all the other four pillars.
In regard to the safer roads and mobility pillar, the research provides documentations of how the roads
are not designed to protect pedestrians and other vulnerable road users. It also shows how newly
maintained and paved roads have been damaged only a few months later due to the lack of organization
among governmental bodies. This results in high government waste of resources, and the lack of
monitoring and evaluation has created an atmosphere for corruption. As for the safer vehicles pillar,
vehicles safety standards in Egypt are almost non-existent. Most of the recent cars sold in the market
are not equipped with basic safety features such as airbags and/or an Anti-lock Breaking System (ABS).
The safer road users pillar also faces a lot of challenges in the presence of the poor law enforcement
and the lack of awareness among road users. As for the post-crash response pillar the failures occur due
to the limited geographical coverage of ambulances and the challenging access to trauma centers. The
challenges in the system result in preventable road traffic deaths and avoidable injuries. Hence, based
on the literature and the findings this research draws a set of recommendations focused on establishing
a road safety lead agency with a legal mandate to address these challenges.
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
The world loses around 1.35 million people every year due to road traffic crashes.
Additionally, up to 50 million people suffer from road crash injuries; some of which are longterm sustained disabilities. Road injuries are the number one cause of death among children
and young people aged 5-29 years. Only 7% of the world’s road deaths occur in high income
countries, while low- and middle-income countries have 93% of the world’s road deaths with
13% and 80% respectively. The highest recorded road fatalities occur specifically in the
African region (WHO, 2018). Moreover, the World Health Organization (WHO) expects the
death rates in these countries to rapidly increase unless new initiatives and increased efforts
are introduced to solve the problem. In March 2010, in response to the global pandemic of
road injuries, the United Nations (UN) proclaimed a decade of action for road safety over the
period of 2011-2020, which aims at decreasing the global number of road fatalities by 50%.
The program called upon the world’s governments to integrate a proposed conceptual
framework for road safety within their national road safety framework. The UN’s framework
consists of five road safety pillars, which are: (1) road safety management; (2) safer roads
and mobility; (3) safer vehicles; (4) safer road users; and (5) post-crash response (WHO,
2014).
In 2010 Members of the UN Road Safety Collaboration formed a consortium to
create a Road Safety Program, the RS10, with a donation from Bloomberg philanthropy to
tackle road safety issues and reduce the high occurrence of road fatalities in 10 low- and
middle- income countries. The 10 countries accounted for more than 600,000 road traffic
deaths annually. Egypt was among the 10 countries which included China, Brazil, India,
Cambodia, Russia, Kenya, Vietnam, Turkey, Mexico, and Egypt. Egypt came first with the
highest road traffic deaths rate per 100,000 population among the 10 selected countries.
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The recorded road traffic death rates were; Egypt 41.6; Brazil 18.3; Cambodia 12.1; China
16.5; India 16.8; Kenya 34.4; Mexico 20.7; Russia 25.2; Turkey 13.4; and Vietnam 16.1
respectively (WHO, 2012). However, in the years following the Egyptian revolution in
January 25, 2011, the RS10 program did not continue in Egypt shortly after it started
(Bloomberg Philanthropies, 2012, 2014). In the years that followed, no other coherent road
safety program or a road safety policy has been introduced in Egypt to date.

1.1Background
Since 2011, Egypt’s population has increased by nearly 20 million (World Bank,
2018), and the number of vehicles on the road has nearly doubled (CAPMAS, multiple
years). Since 2014, the Egyptian government has been focused on increasing the country’s
road network, and Egypt’s vision 2030 marks the country’s road network expansion as a
top priority (Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform, 2018). Yet,
there is no clear road safety program has been introduced to tackle the issues of road safety
in Egypt since the incomplete RS10. Expanding the country’s road network indeed yields
economic benefits as it is marketed by the government; however, it is not directly
proportional with making the country’s roads safer. Road crashes in Egypt mainly happen
due to a human error according to the annual publications of Egypt’s national Central
Agency for Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS, multiple years). A human error can
occur due to one or several factors such as speeding, recklessness, breaking the law, driving
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and/or fatigue (Rechter et al., 2006). The safe
system approach adopted by the United Nation’s road safety framework considers the
fallibility of human beings as part of their nature. Hence, several attributes beyond road
expansions are considered to accommodate a human error without the loss of life (WHO,
2014).
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This study uses the five pillars framework to find answers to its research question:
What are the challenges of road safety in Egypt? Accordingly, another question is tackled
as follows: What are the current road safety conditions in Egypt? These questions are
answered in depth in the findings and discussion chapter with the final objective of drawing
a conclusion and a set of recommendations to address the challenges. The structure of this
research is as follows: Chapter 1, gives a brief introduction about road safety globally, and
road safety in Egypt. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on road safety, which is quite sporadic
in Egypt; hence, it mainly relies on international literature. Chapter 3 defines the conceptual
framework of this study in further details which relies on the UN’s 2010 resolution for a
decade of action of road safety. Chapter 4 explains the methodology of this research which
relies on the analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data through in-depth interview
and the documentation of field observations. Chapter 5, road safety in Egypt: the data
dilemma, shows the discrepancy in Egypt’s crash data, and the uncommon data collection
method of counting only those who die at the crash scene as road fatalities. Chapter 6,
findings and discussion, explores the current conditions and identifies the challenges of
road safety in Egypt. Finally, chapter 7 concludes this research and draws a set of
recommendations for addressing the challenges of road safety in Egypt.

1.2Research Limitations and Delimitations

Knowledge is infinite, hence, the information collected in this study will never cover
all aspects of the current conditions of road safety in Egypt. The sample of the interviewees
from which the qualitative data was collected remains limited compared to a population of a
hundred million Egyptians. The photos and videos documented in the field observations did
not geographically cover all of Egypt, they were focused in urban cities, and particularly the
11

city of New Cairo where the American University in Cairo is located. Hence more traffic
conditions could have been discussed, especially in the undocumented rural areas of Egypt
where 57% of the population exists (World Bank, 2018). However, the findings in this
research can trigger a series of future research which can examine its findings further and in
more depth. The structure of this research can also be applied in other low- and middleincome countries suffering from high numbers of road traffic fatalities and injuries.
Especially in neighboring African countries, because the African continent has the highest
recorded road fatalities.
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this study, the literature review is divided into five sets. The first set of literature
looks into the importance of road safety management in reducing road crashes. The second set
of literature highlights the importance of safe roads and mobility in saving lives on the road
and examines the significance of segregating vulnerable road users; moreover, it examines the
importance of reducing traffic volume by encouraging safer modes of travel such as public
transport in the overall process of safe road use. The third set explores the effects of raising
awareness of safer road users in reducing road injuries. The fourth set examines the importance
of safe vehicles in reducing the number road fatalities and injuries. Finally, the fifth set of
literature explores the significance of post-crash response in saving lives and reducing injuries
upon a crash.

2.1 Road Safety Management
Road Safety activities are multisectoral and intersectoral in which different authorities
carry out different activities and have various responsibilities, some of which have to be
interconnected. The sum of these activities contributes to the final outcomes of road safety.
However, intersectoral activities are difficult to be carried out in a hierarchal government
structure which exists in many countries (Muhlard, 2009). Hence, the UN and WHO stress on
the importance of countries having a lead agency and a national road safety strategy with
measurable targets to manage their road safety. The lead agency overlooks the different
multisectoral and intersectoral activities to ensure the cooperation and alignment of all the
involved stakeholders to fulfill a country’s national road safety strategy. The Global Status
Reports on Road Safety 2009, 2012, 2015, and 2018 discuss the importance of road safety
management through establishing a lead agency – stand alone, or within a ministry, with
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authority and financial resources to manage the activities of road safety. Ideally the lead
agency has a legal mandate with funds allocated in the national budget in order to be able to
develop and overlook the execution of a national road safety strategy. (WHO, 2009, 2012,
2015, 2018). Without a lead agency with adequate funding and technical resources
coordinating the activities of road safety are more likely to fail (Bliss & Breen, 2013)
Under road safety management, speed control is one of the most crucial activities to
be managed; since speeding is a key risk factor in road traffic injuries (WHO, 2004).
Although the establishment of a speed management infrastructure and control require large
financial resources, a study of the cost benefit analysis of speed cameras in the UK showed
that their financial gains from avoided injuries are higher than their cost (Gains, John, &
Stoker, 2005). In high-income countries, 30% of deaths on the road are a result of high-speed
road traffic crashes, while in low- and middle-income countries speeding is the leading factor
of 50 percent of all road traffic crashes (WHO, 2004). There are different types of speed
enforcement such as; stationery enforcement which are at fixed stations and are visible to
drivers and circulating enforcement which could be either visible to drivers or camouflaged.
Both could be done either with deployed police officers equipped with speed monitoring
devices, such as LIDAR guns, for detecting violators. Or the system can be automated with
speed cameras capturing images of the license plates of the violator vehicles. In all cases the
successful management of speed enforcement result in positive outcomes of road safety. For
instance, tickets which are issued as a mean of financial punishment for speed violators result
in lower speeds. There are studies with supporting evidence that tickets have a positive effect
in reducing road injuries (Luca, 2015). Luca found that tickets lead to fewer motor vehicle
accidents and have a larger impact in controlling speed during the nighttime especially. The
study’s overall outcome showed that tickets change the behavior of drivers towards speeding.
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The literature on the causes of speeding is wide, but frequently pointed to two
significant causes, the first is the social acceptability of speeding, and the second is driving
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. A qualitative research carried out by (Blincoe,
Jones, Sauerzapf, & Haynes 2006), examined the views of a sample of prosecuted speed
offenders in the Norfolk County in England. Speeding was largely perceived as widespread
and normal, and many of the drivers lacked the awareness between speed and collisions.
Studies in Australia and New Zealand showed that altering the behavior of drivers towards
speeding through road safety campaigns integrated with speed camera enforcement has
reduced personal injury collisions by up to 32% and 14% in urban and rural areas
respectively (Keall, Povey, & Frith, 2001). A study published by Bogstrand et al. (2015)
examined the relationship between driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, speeding
and seatbelt use among fatally injured car rivers in Norway. The study explained that since
2005 all fatal road traffic crashed in Norway have been analyzed in-depth by a
multidisciplinary investigation teams by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration
(NPRA), and alcohol and/or drugs were found in the blood sample of 40% of the drivers
involved in fatal car crashes, and among the impaired drivers 71.7% were speeding.
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2.2

Safer Roads and Mobility

Human error accounts for some 90% of road crashes (Peden, 2004). An increase in
speed is directly related to the likelihood of a crash occurrence and the severity of the crash. In
case of vulnerable road users, a human error can occur if a driver and/or a pedestrian make a
mistake. If a pedestrian is stuck by a car travelling at 30 km/h they would have a 90% chance
of survival, while if they are struck by a car travelling at 45km/h they would have less than a
50% chance of survival, and if they are struck at 80 km/h they almost have no chance of
survival. A car travelling at 50 km/hr will on average drive 13 meters until it is able to stop,
and a car travelling at 40 km/hr will stop at less than 8.5 meters (WHO, 2018). The higher the
speed of a vehicle, the longer the distance it would travel before the driver can bring it to a
stop. Hence laws of kinetic energy along with the human error factor should be considered
when designing safe roads to avoid the occurrence of 90% of road crashes. Figure 1 (See
Appendix A) show how the relationship between speed and probability of pedestrian fatalities
is highly proportional. The higher the speed of the car, the higher the risk of pedestrian fatality.
Consequently, this set of literature benchmarks the world’s renowned road safety
approach, Sweden’s Vision Zero’s philosophy in which the road design can significantly
reduce road fatalities and address the problem of the human error. Taking into consideration
human fallibility a road safety philosophy, Vision Zero, was created in Sweden and passed in
the form of a road safety bill by the Swedish parliament in 1997. The philosophy
acknowledges that human beings make errors and therefore this must be taken into
consideration when roads are designed to accommodate to possible human errors and in
return protect lives and reduce injuries, ultimately reaching Zero fatalities (Tingvall &
Haworth, 2000). Today, Vision Zero’s philosophy became an international inspiration for
many road safety policies across the world. In addition to being applied in its motherland
Sweden, the global leader in road safety with the smallest number of fatalities, 2.8 per
16

100,000 population (WHO, 2018), the philosophy has been adopted by many countries and
cities and developed and integrated within their national strategies including the UK, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Norway. Moreover Vision Zero has been adopted by many cities in
the US such as New York, Boston, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Columbia, Minneapolis,
Austin, San Antonio, Chicago, Orlando, Denver, Portland, Seattle, and more (Vision Zero
Network, 2018).

2.2.1 Vision Zero Explained
Vision Zero does not accept the traditional concepts of road safety; such as designing
wide and straight roads to give room for evasive maneuvers or creating pedestrian crossings
guarded by traffic lights to protect pedestrians where they can come in contact with vehicles
driven by fallible human drivers travelling at speeds more than 30 km/h (Kim, Muennig, &
Rosen, 2017). Breaking a speed light is a possible occurrence, and such an error can easily
cause death. Following Vision Zero’s philosophy Swedish roads are designed in a forgiving
way to error. The Swedish Road Administration lays the key rules of Vision Zero’s philosophy
as explained below how Vulnerable road users* should not be exposed to speed higher than 30
km/h and in higher speeds they should be separated; for example, pedestrian bridges, or separate
lanes with barriers for cyclists (Swedish Road Administration, 2010). Moreover, Vision Zero
lists some of the road design conditions to separate vehicles of different weights on highways
to ensure safety.

VISION ZERO’S INTEGRATION AND SEPARATION PHILOPSOPHY
1. Vulnerable road users* should not be exposed to
motorized vehicles at speeds exceeding 30 km/h
2. If 1. cannot be satisfied then separate or reduce vehicle
speed to 30 km/h
3. Car occupants should not be exposed to other
motorized vehicles at speeds exceeding 50 km/h in 90
degree crossings
4. If 3. cannot be satisfied then separate or reduce angle
or reduce speed to 50 km/h
5. Car occupants should not be exposed to oncoming traffic (other
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vehicles of approximately same weight) at speeds exceeding 70
km/h or 50 km/h (if oncoming vehicles are of considerably different
weight)
6. If 5. cannot be satisfied then separate, homogenize weights or
reduce speeds to 70(50) km/h
7. Car occupants should not be exposed to the road side in speeds
exceeding 70 km/h or 50 km/h (if road side contains trees or other
narrow objects)
8. If 7. cannot be satisfied separate, remove objects or reduce speed
to 70(50) km/h

2.3

Safer Vehicles

This set of literature shows the importance of vehicle safety standards in reducing
road crashes and saving lives. The most renowned motor vehicle standards are found in the
U.S. and the European Union, and there are also the UN vehicle regulation agreements which
several countries have signed at least one of their three agreements (Glukhenkiy, 2017). Due
to the abundance in research and thorough reports carried by the U.S. National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to constantly evaluate the outcomes of the
continuously updated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) using Fatality
Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data, this part of the literature focuses on previous
research carried on different FMVSS in reducing road fatalities to show the importance of
safe vehicles in saving lives on the road.
To evaluate the success of vehicle safety technologies, a detailed report was carried
by the NHTSA to review the effectiveness 26 different FMVSS. The review showed that
these safety standards have saved about 613,501 between the years 1960 and 2012 (Kahane,
2015). More studies and reports were carried by NHTSA to evaluate various FMVSS over
the years and highlight their impact on saving lives. A report on airbags showed the vital role
side airbags can play upon collision. The report examined the effect of different types of side
airbags in near side impacts using logistic regression analysis of FARS data, the four types of
side airbags examined were the torso only, curtains only, combination- head and torso; and
18

curtains plus torso. The results showed significant estimated fatality reduction percentages
with torso only at 7.8 percent; curtains only at 16.4 percent; combination at 24.8 percent; and
curtains plus torso at 31.3 percent fatality reduction (Kahane, 2014).
As for brake systems, different brake systems have been around for decades, but they
have been evolving along with cars over the years. Antilock Brake System (ABS) was first
introduced in the United States in the late 1960s, and by the mid-90s it became a standard in
many cars. ABS controls the wheels in the vehicle in a way that prevents the car from
skidding. However, reports on the effectiveness of ABS in reducing crashes came
conflicting. NHTSA carried a research program in the area of light vehicle ABS. The
program entailed several tasks to study the effectiveness of Antilock Brake Systems. A
technical paper written by Garrot and Mazzae (1999) gave an overview of the program
results. The ABS proved effective in significantly increasing multi-vehicle crashes and
pedestrian fatal strikes but showed a significant increase in single-vehicle road departure
crashes. The paper concluded that the ABS safety benefits are approximately canceled by its
safety benefits. Then came the Electronic Stability Control (ESC) system, a newer innovation
which was introduced in the mid-1990s. The ESC, which is a spinoff the ABS, was designed
to tackle the safety dis-benefits of the ABS. Instead of braking all four wheels at once like the
ABS the ESC uses sensors to control one or more wheels once a loss of the driver’s control is
sensed (IIHS, 2006). NHTSA issued a statistical evaluation of ESC in 2011 based on FARS
data between the years 1997 and 2009. The analysis estimated that ESC reduced first event
rollovers by a staggering 56 percent for cars and 74 percent for light trucks, SUVs, and vans
19

(LTVs); moreover, it helped car drivers avoid multiple collisions by 18 percent, and reduced
collision with fixed objects by 45 percent for both cars and LTVs. As a result, in 2012 the
American FMVSS introduced article No. 126 “Electronic Stability Control Systems” which
mandates ESC to be standards on all new passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks and buses up to 10,000 pounds (Kahane, 2014).
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2.4

Safer Road User Behavior

Wearing a motorcycle helmet correctly can reduce the risk of death by
40% and the risk of severe injury by over 70%.
 Wearing a seat-belt reduces the risk of a fatality among front-seat
passengers by 40–50% and of rear-seat passengers by between 25–75%.
 If correctly installed and used, child restraints reduce deaths among
infants by 70% and deaths among small children by between 54% and
80%. Source: World Health Organization [Fact Sheet], 2018


The safe system approach focuses on accounting for human error to be absorbed by
the system if implemented correctly. However, one of the UN’s pillars is dependent on the
concept of Safe Road Use. Safe road use focuses on educating the operator of vehicles about
risk factors; such as, driving under the influence, speeding, breaking the law, and distracted
driving. Driving is a tedious process which requires full concentration; hence, impairment is
considered a threat to the overall process of safe driving. There are multiple laws and
regulations globally to control drunk and drugged driving. Alcohol and drug tests are carried
out to determine the level of intoxication through Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) levels
and/or Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) levels to determine the level of intoxication of drivers
when needed (Casanova et al., 2012; Ramaekers et al., 2000) While several countries have
different levels of acceptably legal BAC and THC (WHO, 2018). However, with the aim of
reducing road fatalities more countries are now introducing a zero tolerance for novice
drivers of any age, and commercial drivers (Avenoso, 2017).
A famous study in Michigan U.S. called the Grand Rapids Study investigated the role
of the drinking driver in traffic accidents. The study found that drivers with BAC levels
above zero were more prone to be involved in accidents over drivers with zero BAC level,
also drivers with BAC levels higher than 0.04% were definitely associated with a higher risk
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of traffic accident involvement, and the risk increased rapidly reaching 0.08%, and becomes
extremely high with 0.15% and above. In WHO’s Global Road Safety Partnership (GRSP
2018) good practice manual it was reported that in high income countries 20% of traffic
drivers deaths had excess alcohol in their blood levels, and in low- and middle- income
countries up to 69% of fatally injured drivers had alcohol in their blood.
As for the THC level and the risk of collision, in an observational meta-analysis study
conducted by Asbridge et al. (2012), they found that drivers who drove under the influence of
cannabis were associated with a much higher risk of traffic collision compared to other drivers
who had a zero THC level in their system.
Motor Vehicle injuries can be reduced through protective measures such as helmet use
and seatbelt use. The NHTSA has found that helmets can reduce the risk of road deaths among by
37% and the risk of brain injuries by 65%; moreover, motorcycle riders wearing helmets are 60%
less likely to suffer fatal head injuries when compared to those riders without helmets (Ulmer et
al., 2003). Although Egypt has mandatory helmet use for motorcycle riders, a study carried out in
Egypt’s Mansoura Emergency Hospital showed that none of the 200 motorcycle riders involved
in accidents admitted to the hospital between August 2014 and April 2015 wore helmets. Most of
the motorcycle riders in Egypt do not abide by the helmet law due to the low socioeconomic
level, recklessness, and lack of education (Fouda et al., 2017).

Moreover, safe road use envelops a system where road traffic reduction is highly
encouraged by the government through developing a wide public transport infrastructure.
Public transportation is considered a much safer mode of transport. It only has a tenth of road
traffic injuries compared to other motor vehicle transports, so commuters decrease their
chances of involvement in a road accident by 90% when they use public transport (Litman,
2016).
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2.5

Post-Crash Response

This set of literature is guided by the World Health Organization’s detailed
publication on post-crash response under the name Post-crash response: Supporting those
affected by road traffic crashes. The document divides post-crash response into 3 stages; (1)
at the scene; (2) at the treatment facility; and (3) follow-up. The at the scene and at the
treatment facilities stages are crucial in saving lives, while the follow up stage is more
focused on rehabilitation, management of disability and workplace integration. However, this
set of literature focuses on previously published research on the first two stages only as they
are more related to the core of this research. Moreover, low- and middle-income countries
have problems executing the first two stages of post-crash care making the third stage a
luxury for high income countries. Most of the world’s population do not have access to
prehospital care. The majority of death within the first hours of the crash are a result of
hemorrhage, airway compromise, or respiratory failure, all of which can be treated using first
aide measures (Varghese et al., 2005)
Ideally the first post-crash response at the scene is done by bystanders through contacting a
responsive free of charge universal number which is linked to a centralized ambulance
dispatch system. An equipped ambulance with trained personnel is rapidly dispatched to the
scene. The necessary live saving care is carried out, and the patient is transported to a
treatment facility. Post-crash care is a time sensitive process; therefore, in addition to the
universal number, the fleet size, and the ambulance location and coverage are key elements in
providing timely response (Zaffar et al., 2016).
There are different levels of treatment facilities varying from clinics to trauma centers, and
the ambulance should transport the crash victim to the appropriate facility based on the level
of injuries. Serious injuries should be transported to higher-levels of facility treatments
(WHO, 2016). A study in Victoria, Australia showed that after the introduction of an
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organized and inclusive trauma system has resulted in significant reduction in trauma
patients. Using an injury severity score system, it was found that when the injury severity is
matched with the appropriate level of health facility results in better outcomes, avoidable
deaths and better use of resources. The study shows that the continuous data and feedback
collection, monitoring and evaluation of the trauma system has been a key element in its
success to reduce the mortality rate of trauma patients and suggest a trauma system should be
the standard of health jurisdictions internationally (Cameron et al., 2008)
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Chapter 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Traditionally Road Safety has been based on the concept of the three Es which was
created nearly a century ago. The three Es are Engineering, Education and Enforcement.
Engineering has been divided into safe roads engineering and safe vehicles design. As for
education the concept focuses on the necessary education need for drivers to obtain a license
and also on educating the public in general to increase road safety awareness. While
enforcement focuses on controlling and influencing drivers’ behaviors for safer roads (Bagnara
et al., 2018).
Although a holistic approach of the three Es concept has helped many countries in
reducing their road fatalities and increasing the measures of their road safety (OECD, 2004),
the new safe system approach takes road safety several steps further. The safe system approach
has been derived from the Swedish Vision Zero, and the Dutch Sustainable Safety strategies
(PACTS, n.d.). The safe system approach adopts the three Es concept but additionally
addresses more attributes taking into consideration human fallibility. The approach accepts
human errors as inevitable and takes into consideration the vulnerability of the human body in
case of error occurrence (International Transport Forum, 2016).
In March 2010, The United Nations General Assembly proclaimed a Decade of Action
for Road Safety (2011-2020). The UN’s conceptual framework is based on the successful safe
system approach. Hence, this study adopts the UN’s conceptual framework (See Appendix B).
The framework consists of five pillars which are centered on implementing activities mainly
at a national level rather than a global level. Governments are urged to provide the means for
executing those activities while taking into consideration their own road safety policies and
strategies (WHO, 2014). The five pillars as follows:
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Pillar 1

• Road Safety Management

Pillar 2

• Safer Roads and Mobility

Pillar 3

• Safer Vehicles

Pillar 4

• Safer Road Users

Pillar 5

• Post-Crash Response

Source: WHO, 2014

The first pillar, road safety management, decrees that countries ought to establish
“multi-sectoral partnerships” and other related agencies that would aid in formulizing
strategic plans for local road safety measures based on the collection and assessment of the
current regional conditions. Countries could set those targets complying with the UN accords
related to road safety and by prompting the creation of local organizations like the European
Agreement that created the International Road Transport (AETR). Another target that falls
under the first pillar is the creation of a main strategic agency dedicated to road safety, which
includes different sectoral bodies. In addition, the Road Safety Management urges the
development of a regional strategy that would set guidelines for responsibilities and financial
priorities. Those strategies would be based on “the analysis of national traffic crash data” so
as to have a coherent framework for setting targets as well as to draw a clear funding plan.
The second pillar, safer roads and mobility, aims to enhance the road networks’
conditions to provide safer roads for users, particularly those who are most prone to accidents
such as, for instance, the “pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorcyclists.” (SWOV, 2012).
Countries are urged by the UN to meet this target through eradicating all “high risk” roads by
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the year 2020 and allocating 10% of the government’s budget towards creating safer roads and
infrastructure. Furthermore, it encourages countries to include the planning of safer mobility
in their urban plans and land-use. This could be done through considering different means of
transportations when establishing new buildings or infrastructure in order to ensure safety
usage of the roads. Incorporating different bodies in the country in creating safer roads such
as “development banks, national authorities, [and] civil society” would help raise awareness
and knowledge towards the issue and that the targets could more feasibly met and applied.
The third pillar, safer vehicles, is centered on prompting countries to promote
guidelines for motor vehicle safety and to set assessment programs for new vehicles in order
to ensure their safety usage. Furthermore, countries are urged to include new technologies in
vehicles that would aid in avoiding crashes such as “Electronic Stability Control and Anti-lock
Braking Systems.” This could also be achieved through hindering export or import operations
that deal with used cars that do not meet new safety standards. Lastly, this target could be met
through motivating individuals working both in public and private sectors to purchase cars that
have safer standards that would ensure the protection of users.
The fourth pillar, safer road users, focuses on enhancing the behavior of road users.
This could be done through raising awareness amongst road users to, for instance, wear
seatbelts and helmets as well as highlight the issues of drink-driving and high-speed driving.
To achieve this, a country could create a series of awareness campaigns that could influence
safer road use behavior. Moreover, guidelines are to be established in regards to setting
regulations that would safeguard the road users’ compliance with speed limits and avoiding
drink driving and other related issues that would lead to crash or injury.
The last and fifth pillar, post-crash response, aims at achieving a very important target.
It encourages enhancing post-crash responsiveness level to deliver an improved emergency
response system that would better deal with crash cases in order to ensure that the pre-hospital
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care would aid in the better rehabilitation of the crash victims. This would include developing
the know-how system of removing crash victims from vehicles and enforcing a unified
emergency call number throughout the country. Moreover, it encourages countries to improve
physical and psychological health support to victims in order to minimize trauma through
establishing a proper hospital trauma care system. Additionally, this pillar urges countries to
develop better insurance programs for road users in order to finance more enhanced
rehabilitation systems for victims.

28

Chapter 4: METHODOLOGY
This research was carried over the course of two years between February 2017 and
February 2019. The findings of this research relied on two sources of data 1) qualitative data
of in-depth interviews and participant observations, which were documented through
interview transcripts, field notes, videos and pictures; and 2) quantitative data analysis.
The qualitative data collected in this research are divided into in-depth interviews, and
field observations, and car patrolling to document the road safety conditions using videos and
photos. Moreover, crashes reported in newspapers, television shows, and circulated on social
media portals were examined to identify trends. A total of 28 in-depth interviews were
conducted and the interviewees were divided into three samples. The Frist sample consisted
of 10 crash victims which were defined as anyone a road traffic crash entailed a physical,
emotional and/or financial damage on their lives. For instance, some of the crash victims are
a mother who lost her little girl in a crash, a first-hand crash witness, a young woman who
fractured her ribs in an accident, a young man who endured financial losses after his car was
destroyed in a crash by a drugged microbus driver… etc. Crash victims were reached through
a chain of referrals (snowballing). Initially, this study contacted crash victims after obtaining
their contacts from referrals. Although they have agreed to share their story and the details of
losing their loved ones in a road crash, this method was not correct. It has brought severe
emotional distress and depression to me as a researcher and to some of the crash victims upon
recalling the gruesome details of the crashes. Specifically, the details of some of the crash
victims who lost several and/or all of their family members in road crashes. The effects of
collecting crash victim data without a filter initially compromised this research. Hence, the
study revisited the crash victims’ data collection method. This time the referrals were asked
to only refer crash victims who have made adequate emotional recovery from the trauma.

29

Due to the constraints of this research and this filter, the sample yielded only 10 crash
victims. The second sample consisted of 11 current and former government officials between
senior rankings to lower rankings. The sample size had a number of constraints such as
access to government officials, approvals and time. The interviewees were approached based
on their job positions, and in some cases snowballing through referrals within the sample.
The sample included current and former government officials at CAPMAS, the Ministry of
Interior, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Transportation, and the Ministry of Finance.
The third sample consisted of interviews with seven (7) stakeholders from the private sector.
This sample was also nonrandom, and the interviewees were selected based on their job
positions and referrals. It consisted specifically of a private hospital manager, two private
engineering consultants, an Egyptian law professor, a university student, and two commercial
truck drivers. The third sample was created to triangulate the information from some of the
government officials in the same filed but in the private sector to understand if both the
private sector and the public sector face the same challenges and discuss some of the
solutions like in the case of a public hospital manager and a private hospital manager. As for
the truck drivers, they were selected to know more about their problems and challenges since
truck drivers were widely criticized by the crash victims and there is a public discontent
about their driving behavior in Egypt.
The interviews were conducted following the instructions of AUC’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB). An IRB approval was obtained in February 2017 and renewed for a
second year in February 2018. The interviewees were all briefed about the research and
notified that their identities will not be revealed throughout this research. For the government
officials specifically, their job positions are not mentioned, only the governmental body they
belong/belonged to was mentioned. In addition to the 28 interviewees, the study transcribed
one television interview with the former Chairman and the current member of the Transport
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Committee at the Egyptian Parliament and the Former head of the Egyptian General
Directorate of Traffic in Giza. Moreover, the study includes snapshots from a video aired on
dmc TV channel of a Member of the Egyptian Parliament, lifting parts of a newly paved road
in AL-Behera governorate. The video reflected on the corruption in the public road works.
The research began with interviewing some of the crash victims, and according to the
data collected from the crash victims the study was able to form many of the interview
questions with the government officials and the private sector stakeholders. The sample of
the government officials consisted of some senior officials along with lower ranking officials
for a better sample. Along with the request for an interview, a letter from the AUC’s
Department of Public Policy and Administration was presented to the interviewee explaining
that I am a graduate student conducting a research on road safety. It was also mentioned that
this research will conceal the identity and the job position of all of its interviewees. The topic
was appealing to several officials and the fact that their identity would remain anonymous to
the readers would guard them against any trouble. Additional crash victims were interviewed
at a later stage to assess the pillar of road users’ behavior in Egypt from the road users’
perspective.
In addition, the study carried field observations through documenting the road safety
conditions on a weekly basis using videos and photos since February 2017 until February 2019
to reflect further on the current road safety conditions. Visual documentation of the road safety
conditions is vital, since the research publications on the country’s road safety conditions are
scarce. The main purpose of the visual data is to support the authenticity of this research
findings and defy the published statistics discussed in the data dilemma section which reflects
an enhancement in the country’s road safety conditions. A series of photos and videos were
taken at various locations in Cairo, but the majority was in New Cairo, since it is predominantly
middle-high-income community. The violations and poor road conditions in New Cairo reflect
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that the situation is worse in the poor and low-income communities. The study categorized the
photos based on their contents following the five pillars and used many of them in each sub
section in the results findings. Some of the 2017 captured photos and videos were used as data
reference in some of the interviews; however, only recent photos from 2018 and 2019 were
added to Appendix A to show that the road safety challengers are recent and still on going to
date. Through the photos the readers will be able to link some of the data obtained from the indepth interviews to real life visuals and relate to the road users experience.
Several motor vehicle crashes were researched whether they were mentioned in some
of the interviews or have had received a wide public attention on the social media platforms.
Then the study focused on these specific crashes further by researching them in newspapers,
and television interviews to investigate similar crashes and observe a trend if there were any.
Several school bus crashes were researched to identify commonalities along with crashes that
included truck drivers.
Furthermore, the study analyzed some of the published data on Egypt’s road crashes
and injuries, and a serious discrepancy in data was found. The data discrepancy is discussed
further in Chapter 5, Findings and Discussions. The data analysis was carried on the data
published by the Egyptian Central Agency for Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), the
World Health Organization, and the World Bank for the years between 2008-2017. The data
analysis showed a discrepancy among all three sources; moreover, it showed a discrepancy
even among different publications by CAPMAS. CAPMAS’s Cars & Trains Accidents
bulletin and CAPMAS’s Health Services Statistics bulletin each showed different numbers
for the annual road traffic injuries for the same exact years. The data in the Cars & Trains
Accidents bulletin are retrieved from the Ministry of Interior, while the data in the Health
Services Statistics (Ambulance) bulletin are retrieved from the Ministry of Health. The
analysis showed that each governmental data source reported a different number of road
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injuries for the same exact years. For instance, the recorded road traffic injuries by the
Ministry of Interior in 2014 were 24,154 while the recorded traffic injuries by the Ministry of
Health were 167,364 for the same exact year. The study found that the Ministry of Health
adds trains and metro injuries to its crash fatalities published data in the Ambulance Health
Services bulletin. Prior to 2015, the bulletin provided a breakdown to the types of injuries;
hence, the study compiled the number of trains and metro injuries which was found to be
very small. After the deduction from the total number, the recorded traffic injuries by the
Ministry of Health still remained so much bigger than that recorded by the Ministry of
Interior. Hence, the notable data discrepancy remains unjustified.
Finally, the study concluded this research based on the reviewed literature and the
research findings and discussion chapter. A set of policy recommendations followed the
conclusion with the objective of reflecting some global best practices. The recommendations
are aimed to eliminate the challenges in road safety in Egypt.
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Chapter 5: ROAD SAFETY IN EGYPT:
THE DATA DILEMMA
The Road Safety Management pillar in the UN’s conceptual framework highlights the
importance of a road safety strategy underpinned by data and research (See Appendix B). The
monitoring and evaluation of the strategy and its activities are carried also using data to
measure performance. Data are used by decision makers to guide them through their decisionmaking process. A successful road safety policy and a strategy would require accurate data to
evaluate current conditions and place measurable targets. The process of monitoring and
evaluating the progress of all the activities carried under a road safety strategy would require
accurate data. Without accurate data road safety problems cannot be tackled, and the problems
will continue to get more complex. This chapter discusses the problem of the discrepancy in
Egypt’s crash data, specifically the road fatalities and injuries data. The first section explains
how Egypt’s crash data in the years following Jan 25th, 2011 revolution show an unjustified
significant decrease in the reported data on Egypt’s fatalities and injuries. This decrease goes
against the country’s population increase, vehicles increase, and all the findings in this chapter.
Most importantly the decrease goes against the fact that there were no official announcements
for a road safety policy nor interventions with clear targets and objectives to match the
magnitude of the reported decrease over that specific period of time to date. The following
subsections explain the data dilemma in further details.

5.1 Unjustified Decrease in the Reported Vehicle Crash Data after
2011
An unjustified decreasing trend was discovered in the data in the years following 2010.
Egypt’s population has been steadily increasing for the past decade, more vehicles are on the
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road, Egypt has a problem in traffic enforcement, as it will be explained further in chapter 6;
moreover, no intervention programs on a wide scale with clear objectives and targets have been
fulfilled in the country over the last decade to justify the decreasing trend. According to the
World Health Organization, road crash fatalities are expected to increase in low- and middleincome countries unless there are increased efforts and intervention programs (WHO, 2015).

In 2010 Members of the UN Road Safety Collaboration formed a consortium to create a
Road Safety Program, the RS10, through donations from Bloomberg philanthropy to tackle
road safety issues and reduce road fatalities in 10 low- and middle- income countries that
account to more than 600,000 road tariff deaths annually. Egypt was selected among the
10 countries which included China, Brazil, India, Cambodia, Russia, Kenya, Vietnam,
Turkey, Mexico, and Egypt. Egypt came first with the highest road traffic deaths rate per
100,000 population among the 10 selected countries. Egypt 41.6; Brazil 18.3; Cambodia
12.1; China 16.5; India 16.8; Kenya 34.4; Mexico 20.7; Russia 25.2; Turkey 13.4; and
Vietnam 16.1 respectively (WHO, 2010). However, the RS10 program did not continue in
Egypt. Egypt’s name was removed from the ten countries list on the WHO’s Global and
Road Safety program’s website and the whole program was renamed to Bloomberg
Philanthropies Global Road Safety Program 2010-2014 to include only the other nine
countries China, Brazil, India, Cambodia, Russia, Kenya, Vietnam, Turkey, Mexico
(Bloomberg Philanthropies, 2012, 2014) . The program was renewed again for a second
phase in 2015, and Egypt was not included in the second phase (Bloomberg Philanthropies,
2015). While there are no official statements explaining why the program did not continue
in Egypt to fulfill its purpose, it could have been due to January 25 th revolution in 2011
which shortly happened after the program was initiated. The country had an extended civil
unrest and a second revolution on June 30th, 2013. No other large scale global or national
road safety programs with clear targets and objectives were introduced after the incomplete
RS10 to justify Egypt’s decreasing recorded road traffic crashes, fatalities and injuries in
the years following 2010.
While there are no official statements explaining why Egypt was removed from the list, it
could have been due to the revolutions and the civil unrest the country witnessed in the
years following the Egyptian revolution in 2011.

The information proves that no substantial intervention in Egypt’s road safety existed
to reflect the unexplainable decreasing trend in the country’s road fatalities since 2011 to
date. No other clear road safety programs have been introduced to tackle the road safety
problem in Egypt on a national scale since the incomplete RS10 in 2010 to date. Hence, the
decreasing trend in Egypt’s road fatalities and injuries given also the increasing rate in
Egypt’s population and licensed vehicles is unjustified.
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Although, Egypt has witnessed one of its biggest revolutions in modern history in
January 25, 2011, and many years of unrest and instability followed the revolution, Table 1
below shows a significant decrease in the recorded vehicle crashes, fatalities, injuries and
daily crashes following the year 2011. Moreover, there has been a significant increase in the
Egyptian population, and the number of registered vehicles in the country since 2011. Hence,
the road fatalities and crashes should be increasing in number not decreasing as shown in the
published Egyptian data. Figures 2-4 (See Appendix A) illustrate the unjustified decreasing
trend in the crash data in comparison to the country’s population growth and vehicles
increase in the absence of an intervention.
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Table 1: Recorded population, vehicles and crash data in Egypt

No. of | Year

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Population

79,537,253 80,953,881 82,465,022 84,107,606 85,897,561 87,813,257 89,807,433 91,812,566 93,778,172 95,688,681 97,553,151

Vehicles1

4,240,956

4,686,992

5,159,240

5,853,728

6,369,436

6,607,432

7,037,954

7,860,864

8,636,120

9,351,725

10,320,135

22,900

20,938

22,793

24,371

16,830

15,516

15,578

14,403

14,548

14,710

11,098

6,666

6,603

6,486

7,040

7,115

6,431

6,700

6,236

6,203

5,343

3,747

31,187

35,718

35,428

36,028

27,479

21,620

22,397

24,154

19,325

18,646

13,998

63

57

62

67

46

43

43

40

40

40

30

Vehicle
Crashes
Vehicle Crash
Fatalities
Vehicle Crash
Injuries
Accidents per
day

Source: Author’s compilation based on CAPMAS’ Cars &Trains Accidents Bulletin (multiple years)
Population data based on World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/country/egypt-arab-rep) accessed in June 2018
The Table shows an unjustified decrease in the Crash Data although there is a noticeable increase in the Population and Number of Vehicles Dat

1

The number of Vehicles includes heavy equipment and Tuk Tuk

5.2 Uncommon Road Fatalities Data Collection Methods in Egypt
This study analysis Egypt’s crash data further by examining the used crash data
collection methods. The study found the used data collection method in Egypt is uncommon
in developed countries and in the majority of the Arab world. Countries such as the United
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, Greece,
Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Canada, Australia and many other countries report their data on
crash fatalities with a common standard definition as died within 30 days of crash. Meaning
all crash victims who lost their lives at the crash scene, on the way to the hospital, and all the
other crash victims who later die from their injuries at the hospital within 30 days from their
crash date are reported as road fatalities. While Egypt only reports those, who die at the crash
scene only in its annual road fatalities statistics. Meaning all crash victims who die while
being transported from the crash scene to the hospital or those who died at the hospital are
not reported as road fatalities in Egypt.
The method of reporting only died at crash scene has been the data collection method
of Egypt’s road fatalities even in the years before January 25th, 2011 revolution; hence this is
not a justification for the unjustified decrease in the country’s road fatalities in the years
following the revolution. However, this shows that even the officially unjustified reported
figures are underreported due to the data collection method of reporting only those who died
at scene of crash (CAPMAS, multiple years). Table (2) below shows how all the Arab
country’s road fatalities are reported in WHO’s Global Status Report on Road Safety 2015
with the majority of them reporting their road fatalities defined as died within 30 days of
crash while five countries have even more accurate road fatalities data collection method
with the definition of Unlimited Time Period Following the Crash (World Health
Organization, 2015).

The Global Status Report on Road Safety 2015 included all the Arab countries except for the
following Arab countries; Syria; Comoros; Djibouti and Mauritania. However, it is important
to note that before the Arab Spring, Syria was in the Global Status Report on Road Safety
2009 and its data were defined as died at the crash scene or hospital, and Yemen had a
longer period for collecting data prior to the war which was 7 days in the Global Status
Report on Road Safety 2009 compared to the current collection methodology which is within
24 hours of the crash. This shows that Egypt has been always the least country that reports its
road fatalities among all the reported Arab countries with defined crash collection methods.
Table 2: Road Traffic Fatalities Definition

COUNTRY
ALGERIA

DEFINED AS DIED
WITHIN
30 DAYS OF CRASH


DEFINED AS DIED
AT
SCENE OF CRASH

UNLIMITED TIME
PERIOD FOLLOWING
THE CRASH

BAHRAIN


EGYPT

UNLIMITED TIME
PERIOD FOLLOWING
THE CRASH

IRAQ
JORDAN


UNLIMITED TIME
PERIOD FOLLOWING
THE CRASH
UNLIMITED TIME
PERIOD FOLLOWING
THE CRASH
DIED WITHIN 48
HOURS OF THE
CRASH

KUWAIT
LEBANON
LIBYA
MOROCCO



OMAN



QATAR



SAUDI ARABIA


UNDEFINED

SOMALIA

UNLIMITED TIME
PERIOD FOLLOWING
THE CRASH

SUDAN
TUNISIA

OTHER
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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES



PALESTINE2



YEMEN

WITHIN 24 HOURS OF
THE CRASH

Source: Global Status Report on Road Safety (2015)

According to the American National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) 40% of all drivers killed in fatal car crashes died at the hospital, while 4% of these
drivers died on their way to the hospital (NHTSA, 2007). The medical care system in Egypt
is not as advanced as the medical care system in the United States, hence, it can be assumed
that the killed road fatalities in Egypt which die after being transported to the hospital and
during transportation exceed 40%. Hence, it can be argued that the published number of
Egypt’s road fatalities is missing more than 40%. However, this could also be debatable
because the American Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ensure that vehicles in the U.S.
have high safety standards while Egypt lacks high vehicle safety standards which are
discussed further in section 6.3. This could mean that more crash drivers die immediately at
the crash scene in Egypt than in the U.S. However, this does not change the fact that many
road fatalities are not counted in Egypt due to the uncommon data collection method.

2

The Arab World unanimously has always acknowledged Palestine, and the United Nations has recognized the

sovereign state of Palestine in 2012; however, the statistics on Palestine is mentioned under the name of West
Bank and Gaza Strip in the Global Status Report on Road Safety 2015
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5.3 Conflicting Data
CAPMAS has two different annual publications that report Vehicle Crash Injuries
Statistics. The first is the Car & Train Accidents annual bulletin which reports the number of
both traffic fatalities and injuries while the Health Services Statistics annual bulletin reports
traffic injuries. The Source of data collected in the Cars& Trains Accidents annual bulletin is
the Ministry of Interior (MoI)’s General Directorates of Traffic at the level of governorates
(A traffic department exists for each governorate in Egypt), while the data in the Health
Services Statistics (Ambulance) bulletin is collected from the Ministry of Health (MoH), and
it includes data on traffic injuries treated by the ambulance but no data on traffic fatalities.
The ambulance law in Egypt mandates that they only transfer alive injured individuals. A
hearse, a car specially used for carrying the dead, is responsible for carrying the killed crash
victims from the crash scene. Table (3) shows the big difference between the reported traffic
crash injuries in the Cars& Trains bulletin versus in the Health Services (Ambulance) bulletin
over a period of five years.

Table 3: Traffic Injuries Data from MoH Vs. Data from MoI

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Data Source

Recorded Traffic Injuries

141,920

152,996

167,364

124,867

151,991

Cars & Trains Bulletin

Recorded Road Traffic
Injuries

21,620

22,397

24,154

18,646

19,325

Health Services
(Ambulance) Bulletin

Number of.

|

Year

Source: Author’s compilation based on CAPMAS’ Cars &Trains Accidents Bulletin and the Health
Services Statistics (Ambulance) Bulletin (multiple years)

However, the study found that the data on traffic injuries in the Health Services
Bulletin which is retrieved from the Ministry of Health includes road traffic injuries in
addition to train and metro injuries, unlike the Ministry of Interior’s data in the Cars & Trains
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bulletin which separates between road traffic crashes and train crashes. Prior to 2014
CAPMAS’s Health Services bulletin had a breakdown for the traffic injuries mentioning the
exact numbers of train and metro injuries. Hence, 2014 was taken as a sample and deduct the
the train and metro injuries were deducted from the Traffic injuries to get the net of the road
traffic injuries and compare it to the reported road traffic injuries retrieved from the Cars&
Trains bulletin. The data in Table 4 shows very minimal change in the net road traffic injuries
reported in the Health Services (Ambulance) bulletin after deducting the small number of
train and metro injuries. The Cars & Trains bulletin recorded 24,154 road traffic injuries in
2014 while the Health & Services (Ambulance) bulletin recorded a net of 163948 road traffic
injuries with 75,518 injuries caused by private vehicles alone. The discrepancy in data is
extremely high.
Table 4: Breakdown of Traffic Injuries and net Road Traffic Injuries

Type

|

Year

2014

Tram & Public Buses

9498

Private Vehicles

78518

Bikes/Motorbikes

45404

Trains

3403

Metro

13

Others*

30528

Total

167364

Net Road Traffic Injuries
= Total - (Trains + Metros) =

163948

Source: Author’s analysis based on CAPMAS’s Health Services (Ambulance) 2014 bulletin
*Others are defined as the road’s Tuk Tuk and Carriages; hence, they remained in the calculation

The ambiguity and un-alignment of Egypt’s data on road traffic fatalities and injuries was
also found in international publications. For instance, the data found on Road Fatalities and
injuries in the WHO’s Global Status Report (GSR) on Road Safety, reported Egypt’s crash
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fatalities in 2007, with the same data definition of died at the scene of crash as CAPMAS’s.
Yet the data indicated that Egypt’s road crash fatalities were 12,295, and the road crash
injuries were 154,000. The data source in that report was mentioned as the Egyptian Ministry
of Health (2009) (See Appendix B). While CAPMAS reported only 6,666 road crash
fatalities with the same data definition of died at the scene of crash and only 31,187 road
crash injuries for the same year 2007.
It is important to note that the Data given to WHO by the Ministry of Health
regarding Egypt’s road fatality was not found to be accessible in public records unlike all of
CAPMAS’s publications which are accessible through their website and in print for the
general public. WHO’s Global Status Report on Road Safety continued to have different data
from that of CAPMAS’s since they have been using unpublished data retrieved from the
Ministry of Health until 2015.
In 2015 the report changed its data source and used CAPMAS’s data found in the
Cars & Trains bulletin to report Egypt’s road fatalities (See Appendix B). Ever since, there
has been an unjustified decrease in Egypt’s road traffic injuries and fatalities also in the
recent Global Status Reports. The unjustified decrease reported by WHO is controversial
because it published a report on Egypt noting that in 2009 Egypt had a road traffic deaths rate
of 41.6 per 100,000 populations (WHO, 2012). In addition, Bloomberg Philanthropy who has
donated money to the UN to carry out the RS10 program in collaboration with WHO,
published that Egypt had an average of 31,000 road fatalities in 2010. Meanwhile, WHO’s
most recent GSR 2018 claims that in 2016 Egypt road traffic deaths rate has dropped to only
9.7 per 100,000 population. The 2018 GSR also controversially noted that Egypt has the
same level of speed law enforcement as some of the world’s leading countries in road safety.
In the report Egypt received 8 out of 10 for the level of its national speed law enforcement,
which was the same score given in the report to Sweden and the United Kingdom. This all
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goes against the findings of this study which show that the road safety conditions are getting
worse not better. The findings in the following chapter, show that the country does not have
enough police officers to enforce the law on its rising population nor does it have a national
automated speed enforcement system that could serve as an alternative to monitor road
violations. Therefore, it is unfounded that the speed law enforcement in Egypt is at the same
level of enforcement in Sweden or the United Kingdom who are leading countries in road
safety with traffic death rates of 2.8 and 3.1 per 100,000 population respectively (WHO,
2018).
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Chapter 6: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The findings document the country’s actual current road safety conditions and identifies
the challenges in each area of the five pillars. The data in this chapter was obtained through a
series of in-depth interviews with stakeholders and field observations. Visual documentations
of the current road traffic conditions were collected to further support the research findings.
The following subsections are divided according to the UN’s five pillars framework.

6.1 Road Safety Management
This section explores the road safety management conditions and challenges. The data
collected from the interviewees reflect on the problems of the poor road safety management
conditions in Egypt. The root causes of the problems are divided into three findings which
are the absence of leadership, poor traffic law enforcement, and enforcement challenges. The
absence of leadership is a cross cutting problem across all the five pillars, but it is especially
highlighted in the road safety management as management affects all the other four pillars.
Interviewees from the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Interior, and engineers
from an involved private sector stressed on the need for leadership on road safety activities.
As for crash victims they expressed their discontent from the poor traffic law enforcement in
Egypt. The data from some of the crash victims were discussed with officials at the Ministry
of Interior and discussed further to understand the third finding, which is why the traffic
enforcement in Egypt is poor; i.e. enforcement challenges.
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6.1.1 Absence of Leadership
Interviews with current and former government officials at the Ministry of
Transportation (MoT), the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and private engineering consultants
were conducted to understand more about the execution of road safety activities in Egypt.
When the interviewees were asked about Egypt’s road safety management, the most
commonly criticized problem was the absence of leadership.
The absence of leadership created deeply rooted problems within the traffic police
operations. Two MoI officials explained that it usually results in the diffusion of
responsibility, and the obstruction of their operations, noting:
We don’t know who we belong to, officially our traffic department
belongs to the Ministry of Interior, but in real life applications this is not
the clear answer. Our Traffic department gets its funding from the
governor, so it needs to persuade the governor with its own targets and
plans year by year not the Ministry of Interior. If the governor has other
targets in mind other than enhancing the traffic conditions, then we don’t
get the money we really need to function effectively.
(Senior MoI official, personal communication, September 2017)

The second one added,
It is not like we don’t know what’s happening abroad, we want to do all
these nice things here in our country, like the automated enforcement,
traffic lights, and police patrolling on highways, extra. If we have money
we will do a lot with it, but we just have enough to keep us going as we
are. No money for development what so ever.
(MoI official, personal communication, September 2017)

The MoI officials explained that the traffic department lacks identity and a sense of
belonging. There is not only a diffusion of responsibility but a diffusion in the organizational
structure of the traffic department which results in the absence of a dedicated allocated fund.
The senior MoI discusses the problem of finance, and how there is no mandated government
budget specified for covering the costs of traffic enforcement in Egypt. When he was asked
about the money collected from the traffic fines, he explained that the job of the traffic
department is to report the traffic violations and issue fines, but none of the money collected
goes to the traffic department.
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There is a traffic department for each governorate in the country, and officially these
traffic departments belong to the Ministry of Interior; however, their budgets are mandated
by the governors in each governorate not by the ministry of Interior. Therefore, each traffic
department needs to present their strategy and execution costs annually to their governor and
s/he either approves or disapproves the suggested budget. Second, each governor has their
own agenda in mind, and it is not necessarily related to improving the traffic conditions, so
he explains that the process of allocating their funds turns into a haggling process most of the
time to obtain the money they need for their operations from the governor. The majority of
the governors’ objectives are not aligned with the objectives of the traffic departments, so
they try to give them the minimum amount to keep the operations going as they are. Both
MoI officials explained that they are fully aware of what happens in developed countries and
they wish to see the same applications in Egypt. However, the final result is that the
development of the traffic departments in Egypt will never progress this way, because with
the lack of fund allocation there is never a place for a vision or a long-term strategy. Even
with their day to day activities they still face challenges because the money is usually not
fully allocated.
In addition to the problems of finance, the absence of road safety leadership resulted
in marginalizing the importance of specialization for traffic police officers. The
organizational structure of police officers within the Ministry of Interior does not reflect
career stability. Meaning a specialized traffic police officer working in the traffic department
can be mandatorily moved to any other police department irrespective of his specialization
within MoI at any time. A senior MoI official explains how their jobs and years of experience
does not guarantee their continuation within the traffic department, noting:
The feeling of instability and not knowing where we belong is caused by
many factors not just where we get the funding from […] my colleague
worked over 10 years in our department [traffic]. He had so much
experience in the field and was great at what he did, but one day he woke
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up to find himself moved to an irrelevant department that he had no
experience in what so ever. His sudden movement was a loss of expertise
to our department.
(Senior MoI official, personal communication, September 2017)

The Senior MoI official reflected on what happened to his colleague to explain the instability
within the traffic department. His colleague’s 10+ years of experience were wasted when he
was moved to an irrelevant department where he had no experience in. He expressed that this
results in eliminating the sense of belonging and security which the traffic police officers
should have. Career clarity and development is an important motivational factor to do a job.
In addition, the structure of the traffic authority cannot develop if its expertise is wasted.
While the absence of leadership is the biggest problem obstructing the enhancement
of the road safety management in Egypt, officially -on paper- there are two bodies in the
government’s framework dedicated for traffic and road safety. A 1982 Supreme Council for
Traffic was mandated to be formed under the traffic law article 66 for the year 1973.
According to the Egyptian law the council is specialized in drafting traffic policies and
mandating the programs and framework of the stake holding authorities. However, the
Council was never initiated nor summoned ever since it was created, and only remains in the
Egyptian law as a sub-article (Fekry, 2017). In addition, Egypt has a national council for road
safety, but it does not have any authority, it is more like an advisory board as an MoI official
explains:
The national council for road safety doesn’t have any legislative power. It
recommends some issues related to road safety, but its recommendations
are not binding. While the never summoned Supreme Council for Traffic
has so much authority mentioned and mandated in the Egyptian law. It is
baffling how it is not being utilized.
(MoI official, personal communication, September 2017)

The MoI official explains that there is no real benefit from the national council for road
safety, because the council has no authority and its word is not binding by law. While the
never summoned Supreme Council for Traffic has a binding authority by law over
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stakeholders involved in road traffic activities. Hence, it does not make sense that the
Supreme Council for Traffic was never summoned.

The absence of road safety leadership results in government waste of finance,
resources, knowledge and even halts its development. A former senior official at the Ministry
of Transportation expressed his disappointment about the abandonment of great studies and
projects whenever there is a change in the ministry’s office, noting:
A newly appointed minister likes to prove himself and introduce new
projects and ideas. Some of these ministers would halt the progress of a
great project by their predecessors. We have had great studies for much
needed projects that never came to light. Money, time, effort and
knowledge were just wasted.
(A former senior MoT official, personal communication, April 2017)

The senior official who served at the Ministry of transportation prior to 2011 recalls back the
process of a newly appointed minister coming into office. He explained that new ministers
were usually excited to prove their competency through conducting studies and introducing
new projects. Over the years he came across great project studies, some of which had huge
budgets and were covered by either public money or grants. However, many of these projects
were never executed because the lifetime of a minister at the ministry does not necessarily
guarantee that execution of these studies nor the continuation of some of the projects initiated
during his tenure. Government waste is the outcome of the abandonment of many great
project studies which are archived at the Ministry, and some of which are now outdated.
Another MoT complained about not seeing the fruit of his hard work when he worked
at the ministry because of the absence of leadership which resulted in the lack of coordination
and disorganization of priorities among the involved parties, noting:
In my department we collected and reported crash blackspots data.
However, several previously reported crash blackspots remain to date. Our
job was only to collect and present this data to another government body
and that’s it.
(A former MoT official, personal communication, October 2017)
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Crash blackspots are specific locations where crashes had historically occurred frequently.
The MoT official explained that although there is data on the locations of the crash
blackspots, crashes continue to happen at some of the reported locations. The ultimate
objective of collecting crash blackspots is to prevent the reoccurrence of crashes at the
reported locations. However, the intersectoral activity of preventing the reoccurrence is not
fulfilled due to the activity’s tasks being divided among different government bodies, and
once a government body does not fulfil their task, the activity fails, and the objective is not
met. He mentions that his department had no authority over the other involved party to ensure
the execution of the task, and in general there was no coordination among the stakeholder’s
multisectoral activities. Hence, several crash blackspots which have been reported years back
still exist.
In the case of New Cairo’s traffic lights project failure, a senior MoI official
explained his deep frustration with the ongoing significant waste of government expenditure.
He explained that the traffic department found that the local government in the city of New
Cairo (the city is under his department’s jurisdiction) placed traffic lights in the streets
without any coordination with the traffic department. He explained that they did not even tell
them about the project which resulted in its complete failure, noting:
One day we just discovered new traffic lights haphazardly placed in New
Cairo. We are the traffic department that operate traffic lights and did not
even know about them [traffic lights] until we saw them in the streets.
They were placed by the local government without any prior studies or an
operational plan. As a result, they caused several traffic accidents, and
some were removed, while many others are just standing there nonoperative. […] If they [the local government in New Cairo] have excess
money to spend, then why not coordinate with us? […] It was a fishy
project.
(Senior MoI official, personal communication, July 2017)

In this quote, the senior MoI official explained that a local government authority wasted the
government’s money by placing traffic lights in New Cairo without prior planning. Traffic
lights control, and coordination are run by the traffic department. Prior studies for the traffic
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flow and traffic design are needed before placing traffic lights, otherwise the traffic lights
might result in accidents if they are wrongly placed. In addition, the traffic lights need to
have traffic operators which are provide by his department, so it was strange how these traffic
lights were randomly placed without any prior notice or consultation with his department.
Moreover, he highlighted the waste of government expenditure when he mentioned that some
of the traffic lights were removed while other traffic lights still remain non-operational in the
streets. He briefly discussed the corruption involved in the project, and how it most likely had
other objectives which brought some officials financial gains. He explained that corruption
and nepotism is highly found in some local governments. When his department asked about
the source of these traffic lights, it was a company he never heard of before.
According to the Egyptian law, the procurement of any public project needs to be
done after issuing a public tender with project specifications. However, in the case of the
traffic lights in New Cairo, the traffic department knew nothing about the entire project until
they found the traffic lights randomly placed in the streets. From the field observations
carried out by this study, there is not a single operative electric traffic light in New Cairo, and
all the traffic is manually managed by traffic guards, low ranked MoI guards that manually
use hand movements to regulate traffic. Figures 5-8 (See Appendix A) reflect further on the
state of the haphazardly placed out of service traffic lights in New Cairo.

6.1.2 Poor Traffic Law Enforcement

Traffic law enforcement is directly correlated with the frequency of human error
crashes resulting from traffic violations such as speeding, distracted driving, and/or driving
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. Luca provided evidence that traffic law
enforcement had a direct effect on road crash reduction (2015). The high percentages of
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human error reflected in CAPMAS’s data indicate a high percentage of traffic violations
being the main cause of crashes in Egypt. CAPMAS’s data showed that 78.9%of the crashes
that occurred in 2017 were a result of a human error, and in 2016, 72% of the crashes were a
result of a human error (CAPMAS, 2017 & 2018). Moreover, Egypt tried to solve its road
traffic problems by changing its traffic law four times since 1998 with the most recent one
issued in 2017, yet the problem of poor enforcement continues (El-Melegy, 2017). Several
crash victims argued that poor traffic law enforcement is the leading cause of crashes in
Egypt. One victim spoke about the drugged state of the truck driver who killed her child,
noting:
The truck driver that ran over our car and killed my child was dangerously
speeding. He hit the body of our car into another truck in front of us, my
daughter did not die from the first hit, but he continued going at it and
trying to detach the body of our car, which was partially stuck underneath
his truck, so he reversed and crashed us a second time, this is when my
daughter died and he fled the crash scene […] He was later caught and the
tests showed that he was seriously drugged. How are these drugged people
with these huge vehicles left on the road without being controlled?
(Crash victim, personal communication, November 2017)

The crash victim discussed the details of the crash which caused her severe injuries and
resulted in the death of her child. She blames the poor traffic law enforcement for allowing
truck drivers to excessively speed on the road and drive under the influence without being
controlled. The actions of the truck driver under the drug influence did not pardon the life of
her daughter after the first hit, but due to his drugged state his mind was only focused on
fleeing the crash scene, so he continued to hit their car for a second time to detach it from his
truck.
Another crash victim who witnessed a crash due to a speeding driver under the
influence explains:
I was driving on 6 of October bridge when suddenly a car fell off the
upper part of the bridge and landed on another car in front of me. I went
out of my car and ran towards the cars along with many people. Two
young people in the crushed car were instantly dead, while the driver in
the car who landed on them was under the influence and was unaware of
his surroundings
(A crash victim, personal communication, September 2017)
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The crash victim experienced severe distress from what he had seen at the crash scene,
especially that the crash fatalities in the crushed car were young people who had no control
over the crash. The unaware state of the offender caused his excessive speeding that made his
car fly off the bridge and land on another car. His level of intoxication was so high that he
remained unaware of what was going on even after the crash had occurred.
All crash victims were asked about the police response to the crash scene. Some of
the crash victims involved in non-fatal crashes, specifically non-serious injury crashes,
reported that the police did not effectively respond to their calls after noting the state of the
victims on the phone.
However, crash victims involved in crashes resulting in serious injury and/or fatalities
have reported that the police responded to their calls and reached the scene in a reasonable
amount of time. Yet, they had other complaints that went beyond response time; for instance,
common complaint regarding the police not taking the necessary measures to document the
wrong doings of the crash offenders such as drug tests and properly filled police reports. This
made them lose their right at court and some of them could not fully convict the killer drivers
because the judge did not have enough evidence on paper, nor were there CCTV cameras to
record the crashes. The crash victim who lost her daughter explained that there were no
CCTV cameras near the crash scene, noting:
There were no cameras to record the drugged truck driver who hit us
several times on purpose to detach the body of our stuck car from his
truck. There was no evidence to prove to the judge that my daughter died
from the second hit when he hit us again on purpose to flee the scene. So,
he got a manslaughter sentence.
(Crash victim, personal communication, November 2017)

Although the truck driver deliberately crashed their car more than once to detach it from his
truck, there was not enough substantial evidence to convict him of killing her daughter on
purpose. No CCTV cameras were nearby to record the exact events of the crash; hence, the
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judge could only give him a manslaughter sentence, which is a minimum sentence for
involuntary killing.
Another crash victim explained that because the crash report was not filled correctly,
the judge did not have enough material to convict the killer driver, noting:
The crash drawing was not present in the crash report; hence the judge
could not do anything. He did not have enough material to convict the
driver […] No cameras recorded the accident.
(Crash victim, personal communication, September 2017)

Crash reports in Egypt are done manually, a police trustee (assistant) is usually the one who
fills in the crash report. In addition to collecting the data of the crash victim, and crash
offender, he has to illustrate the crash scene by manually drawing it in the report. This crash
victim explained that the drawing of the crash scene was not illustrated in the report; hence,
the judge did not have enough evidence to convict the offender.
Moreover, there were multiple complaints about the drug tests retrieved from the
crash offenders. One crash victim who lost a family member explained:
We could not find the drug test at the police station the second day.
(Crash victim, personal communication, November 2017)

The family could not find the drug test although the crash offender took the test and it came
out positive on the day of the crash, but when they family’s lawyer went to the police station
the next day to collect all the paper work, he could not find the drug test.
As for the interviews with crash victims involved in non-serious injury crashes
showed that offenders were not held accountable due to the poor enforcement of the law. All
the crash victims involved in non-serious injury crashes had a problem with the police
response time to the crash scene, except for one crash victim because there was a police
officer nearby her crash scene. Those who contacted the police hot line to report the crash
were asked about the type of the crash and whether there were serious injuries involved or
not. One crash victim argues that she felt there was a filtration process to assess whether the
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police should arrive to the crash scene or not based on the type of crash injuries involved,
noting:
The car was totaled […] I called the police hotline to notify them about the
crash, the first question I was asked was “are there any fatalities or serious
injuries” and I answered no, then the police did not show up although I
called them 12 times in addition to the many other calls made by family.
The crash happened at 11.30 am and because they knew I would not stop
calling, the police station eventually sent two police trustees on a
motorcycle at 5 pm
(Crash victim, personal communication, March 2018)

The victim explained that the car damages were very severe. The victims included her 68year-old father in-law who was driving at the time, his wife and two children in the car, one
of whom is an autistic child who suffered a severe emotional trauma from the crash yet had to
wait nearly six hours until the police finally arrived at the crash scene. She insinuated that
there is a filtration process used to assess whether the police should arrive to the crash scene
or not based on the severity of the crash. Also, when the police finally arrived, there were two
police trustees on a motorbike and not a police officer, and they were very uneducated that
they even suggested that the victims should break the car of the offender to get even, because
the law won’t get them a reimburse them for the damaged car, noting:
They told us you won’t be able to get any financial rights, this is not the
case in Egypt, we are not in Canada. Instead they suggested we take some
rocks and crash the offender’s car and get equal or beat him up if we like.
Their behavior was shocking, but we still persisted on filing a police report
[…] A police report was not filed, and my father-in-law was forced to
settle with the offender on site for only 4,000 pounds.
(Crash victim, personal communication, March 2018)

The crash victims are Canadian Egyptians, and they expected to see a full process that would
protect their rights and reimburse them for the financial losses they have endured. When the
police trustees learned of their dual nationality and their high expectations, they explained to
them that things do not work this way in Egypt. They would never get back their right
through the law because courts here take forever to hand down a verdict, and even if it
happens after many years it will be a very small amount of money insignificant to the cost of
the car damages. Moreover, the ill-educated police trustees gave the victims bizarre
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suggestions to get revenge on the offender such as causing equivalent damages to his car by
throwing some big rocks at it, or even physically beating up the offender and close the
subject. Eventually a police report was not filed, and the victims were placed in a situation
where they had to settle with whatever the offender offered. They were reimbursed a very
small amount of money of 4,000 Egyptian pounds which is insignificant compared to the
damages the offender caused to their car.
In addition to the data retrieved from the interviewees, field observations documented
in figures 9-28 (See Appendix A) reflect further on the poor traffic law enforcement in Egypt.
Figure 9 shows a child between the age of 10-12 years old driving a heavy loader on North
90 Street in broad day light. Figure 10 shows a child driving a tricycle on the wrong side of
the road. Figures 11-15 show dangerously loaded trucks with the majority of them without
license plates driving around the city of New Cairo. Figures 16-18 show private cars driving
around the city without license plates. The problem of vehicles without license plates can be
observed in different kinds of vehicles including motorcycles such as the one shown in
Figure 19.
As for vehicles with license plates figures 20-24 highlight the recent problem of
license plates in Egypt. An electronic license plates system was introduced in Egypt in 2008,
and by law all vehicles had to change their non-electronic license plates to the new electronic
ones which were manufactured in Germany. However, in the years following January 25,
2011 revolution Egypt stopped importing the electronic license plates from Germany
(Eskandar, 2012). Since then all the new license plates have locally manufactured in Egypt
and they are non-electronic. Many of which are poorly handwritten with markers as shown in
the figures. From the field observations it is noted that all the new poorly printed or
handwritten non-electronic license plates are issued in all of the Egyptian governorates,
except in Cairo and Giza governorates
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In 2008, Egypt changed its standard vehicle license plates to electronic license plates manufactured by the
German factory Utsch. The new advanced plates were categorized into different colors based on the type of
vehicles. The next step was to introduce a wider automated enforcement system to monitor the electronic licenses.
However, after the revolution there was a controversy related to directly awarding the contract to the German
factory Utsch without competitive bidding (Eskandar, 2012). An Egyptian court in 2011 sentenced Utsch’s
chairman and CEO to one year in prison in absentia. In return Utsch filed an international arbitration case against
Egypt and they no longer supplied the country with electronic licenses (Enterprise, 2017).
The number of registered vehicles in 2012 was 6,607,432 and up until the last published registered vehicles data
in 2017 was 10,320,135 (CAPMAS, 2017). Hence an increase of 3,712,703 vehicles occurred over this 5-year
period without the supply of Utsch’s electronic license plates, or an alternative electronic license plates supplier.
Instead, Egypt returned back the old license plates system for the newly issued plates which are either manually,
printed, sprayed or handwritten. Some of the new license plates are poorly handwritten as shown in some figures
below.

Several other road traffic violations were observed as shown in figures 25-27 (See
Appendix A), such a the Volvo SUV driven on the opposite side of a highway as seen in
figure 25, parking in the middle of the road as seen in figure 26, and parking in a disabled
parking spot without a permit as seen in figure 27. It is common in Egypt for drivers without
disabilities to occupy disabled parking spots; hence, many parking operators try to combat
this phenomenon by placing barricades in front of the disabled parking spots to reserve them
for disabled drivers as shown in figure 28.
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6.1.3 Enforcement Challenges
The data collected from the crash victim interviewees and the documented photos
clearly show that there is a serious problem with traffic law enforcement in Egypt. Hence,
this study asked government officials at the MoI several questions drawn from the collected
data to understand the root causes of the poor traffic law enforcement problem. In addition,
one televised interview with the former chairman and the current member of the Transport
Committee at the Egyptian Parliament and the Former head of the Egyptian General
Directorate of Traffic was transcribed. The data in this sub section indicated that there are
three major challenges hindering traffic law enforcement in Egypt. 1) Shortage in police
officers; 2) shortage in automated enforcement; 3) wrongly addressing the shortage.

Shortage in Police officers
All of the interviewed MoI officials indicated that there is a shortage in police
officers, and this shortage is a major root cause of the poor traffic enforcement problem.
When asked why police officers are not significantly visible on the streets, a senior MoI
official explained that it is the case because the total number of all police officers in Egypt is
very small, noting:
You don’t see us on the streets everywhere because our number is very
small, we are around 35,000 police officers. I am talking about actual
police officers that graduated from the police academy and are currently in
the force, not the police trustees. Out of those 35,000 serving the entire
population, a much smaller number represents the traffic police
departments.
(Senior MoI official, December 2017)

There are no published data on the exact number of police officers in the Egyptian police
force; however, a close approximation of 40,000 police officers in the force was also
mentioned by other police officers in a study on the prospects of police reform in Egypt
by Allam (2015). The senior MoI official explains that this small number is not just
traffic officers, but all kinds of police officers in the Egyptian police force. This number
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is very small in comparison to the large Egyptian population which is around 100
million (World Bank, 2017). He clearly explains that this number represents the police
officers who graduated from the police academy, it does not include police trusties
(Omnaa Shorta). Police trusties are police assistants who do not graduate from the police
academy but from a police trustees institute, and their job is to assist police officers in
carrying out their daily tasks and activities.
When asked about the slow response to crash scenes, one MoI official explained that
the understaffing is the cause of the no show or the slow response to many of the crashes.
If an accident happens towards the end of the Sokhna road [highway] for
example, it would take the officer most of his day to travel forward to the
crash scene and backwards to his base. If an accident happened within a
close time range but at the beginning of the road after he already left his
station, he will not be able to physically be at the second crash scene. It
isn’t because police officers are not doing their jobs like some people
think of us, it is because we are very understaffed.
(MoI official, personal communication, December 2017)

The MoI official explained that police officers do their jobs and place a lot of effort but due
to the fact that they are severely understaffed they cannot tend to the large population and
large area of coverage. He gave Sokhna highway road as an example in his explanation to
indicate that the occurrence of more than one accident along the same road but in different
locations make it difficult for the stationed police officer to tend to them all.
Drawing on the data recorded of truck driver violations, and the data from crash
victims about the involvement of intoxicated drivers in the crashes. The MoI officials were
asked why these violations go unpunished. A MoI official also linked the shortage of police
officers and the lack of alternative enforcement tools noting:
If I catch a truck driver today another one will come tomorrow and do the
exact same thing again. We cannot catch them all, we do not have the
capacity nor the tools of enforcement to do that, plus many of the truck
drivers here [New Cairo] are Bedouins. Especially the ones carrying the
building construction materials.
(MoI official, January 2018)
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The MoI official explains that they are outnumbered by the truck drivers, so even if they
catch one violator there will still be many others committing the same violations. He briefly
mentioned the Bedouin truck drivers that dominate the transportation of the building
construction materials indicating that they are lawless citizens and difficult to deal with. A
Government prosecutor Mohamed Yahya was murdered in New Cairo in 2016 on the hands
of Bedouins. The Bedouins had settled in one of his lands illegally and he went to confront
them to leave his land accompanied by police forces. The armed Bedouins refused to leave
the land and instead shot the government prosecutor five times killing him at the scene, and
injuring another police officer (Sobhy, 2016). Hence, there is a general fear from dealing with
the Bedouins.
Another MoI official argued that the small number of police officers is not
problematic in case there were other tools of enforcements, noting:
Not every law-abiding country has a lot of police officers, but in their
cases, they supplement the small number of police officers with advanced
automated enforcement. But here in Egypt we lack both.
(MoI official, personal communication, December 2017)

He explains that some countries have a small police population, but in their case, they
rely on automated enforcement to support police officers. The problem in the poor law
enforcement in Egypt is severe, because Egypt suffers from a shortage in both, police
officers, and automated enforcement.

Shortage in Automated enforcement
The former chairman and the current member of the Transport Committee at the
Egyptian Parliament and the Former head of the Egyptian General Directorate of Traffic in
Giza, openly discussed the problem of the shortage in automated enforcement in Egypt
during a telephone interview aired on Al-Mehwar TV channel. He explained that Egypt does
not have an automated system for enforcement. There are only very few cameras on the road,
but they are not working in an automated way. He said the following to the presenter:
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when it comes to monitoring the roads, our roads are not monitored, I am
being very honest […] the cameras that we have are very limited, the ones
in Cairo none of them are functioning properly, the ones on the Mehwar
[an Egyptian highway] we can’t work with them because they only work
manually[the pictures and videos need to be manually downloaded from
the camera on site][…].We need the fine to be like abroad, it goes straight
to public prosecution and tells the citizen instantly that they have broken
the law. If you are instantly notified that you have been fined for breaking
the law while driving, will you break the law again? You will not break
the law again […]
(Former Chairman of the Transportation Committee at the Egyptian
Parliament, transcribed tv interview, December 2017)

He explained in the interview that the very few cameras that are on some Egyptian roads are
not fully automated. Police trustees are usually deployed to the location of each of these
cameras to manually download the photos and videos off the camera on a flash drive, and
then they return them back to the traffic department to process them and issue fines. The
process is very long, and hectic unlike automated enforcement in other countries. He argues
that countries with automated enforcement have less traffic violations. The instant
notification a traffic violator receives on their phones make them less prone to committing
another traffic violation. While in Egypt, traffic violators are notified about the majority of
their traffic violations when they renew their car license.
To understand the problem of the shortage in law enforcement even further, The
former chairman’s comments were discussed with officials from MoI. One MoI official
indicated that Cairo’s former governor used the consultancy services of a renowned
international company in automated service to install cameras in the Cairo city. These
cameras were installed, and the project entailed a big budget. However, there was a major
issue with these cameras as he explains:
The consultancy company indicated internet fiber optics cables to be
connected to these cameras in the project specifications. However, this
was totally skipped to allegedly save time and money. Instead 3G Wi-fi
connections were installed on some of the cameras. It is impossible to
upload and download a 24-hour feed off of 3G Wi-fi instantly, so it has to
be done manually. You can use some of these cameras with 3G only to
monitor the traffic flow like the former chairman said. […] This project
was a waste of public money, and it was done quickly for the purpose of
showing off and taking credit, not to serve the issue of automated
enforcement.
(MoI official, personal communication, December 2017)

61

When the internet fiber optics cables were not installed, the cameras did not become fully
automated as a result. In order to download the data from the cameras a police trustee is
deployed to the camera’s site and downloads the data manually as the former chairman has
indicated. The MoI official made several remarks in the above quote briefly discussing the
corruption involved in this project. He explained that the governor intended to finish this
project as quickly as possible to gain credit and be recognized for his work. Hence, he
skipped the fiber optics cable specification deliberately even though he knew that it would
seriously affect the outcomes of this project. Eventually, these cameras now are used as just
monitors for the traffic flow by the traffic operations room. Finally, he indicated that
automated enforcement has to be done in collaboration with the Ministry of Communication
and Information Technology, because fiber optics cables need to be extended to new projects
that involve automated enforcements.

Wrongly Addressing the Shortage
Some of the interviewed MoI officials complained about the large numbers of
Police trustees in the force which they described as a wrong remedy to address the
shortage in police officers. Figure 31 (See Appendix A) shows three members of the
police force, the one standing in front is a police officer with gold stars on his badge,
while the police trustee who is wearing an almost identical uniform has a badge with red
lines. Police trustees graduate from a two years institute and not from the police
academy and are socially considered as a lower rank of officers. Their socioeconomic
level and educational background are much lower than that of police officers, but their
numbers are much more than police officers. The exact number of police trustees is also
not officially published; however, during the interviews with government officials which
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included several police officers they all suggested a common estimated range for the
police trustees between the numbers of 150,000-200,000 trustees in the force. This
estimation goes beyond four times the estimated number of police officers. Hence,
police trustees are the dominant face of enforcement and are used to fill in the job of the
understaffed police officers at many cases like the one mentioned by a crash victim
above.
However, the wide illiteracy, lack of training among many police trustees affect
their work performance which in return affects the work of police officers. A MoI
official explains that the task of crash reporting is handled by police trustees; however,
the crash data is usually under reported due to the illiteracy and lack of training among
trustees. He explains:
Many of the trustees struggle with reading and writing. So, I would say
that out of every 1000 crash reports filled no more than a few are filled
correctly. This really negatively affects our data collection on crashes,
which makes it difficult to collect things like blackspots or understand the
trend in crashes in general to tackle a reoccurrence. It also affects those
involved in the crash, because lousy crash reports result in victims losing
their rights in court or face difficulties with their insurance company if
they have one.
(MoI official, personal communication, December 2017)

He explains that the traffic department faces difficulty when compiling crash data due to
the fact that many handwritten crash reports are filled by police trustees. Many of these
trustees are either illiterate, untrained and/or unqualified to fill the crash reports. Hence, it
is difficult to retrieve correct data from the crash reports. Moreover, some crash victims
are harmed in the process because the crash evidence which is the report is not filled
correctly. As a researcher I was allowed to look at an empty crash report, but I was not
allowed to take any copies, nor pictures. I found that filling the crash report form is an
extremely tedious process even for a literate individual, the form had a very small font and
many lines to be filled in several pages. An illustrative drawing of the crash scene is
required to be filled in the report. The MoI official adds:
63

Reading crash reports is a tormenting process, the handwriting, the
spelling mistakes, the unclear crash illustrations, the empty lines, all this
and more make many of those crash reports faulty. If we have the budget,
it would be so much better for all of us if trustees used cameras and CADs
for crash reports instead.
(MoI official, personal communication, December 2017)

He explains that at the traffic department they struggle to read the handwriting of the filled
crash reports, even if they were filled correctly. In many cases, it is difficult to understand
the crash scene drawings because not everyone has the gift of drawing. Moreover, many
crash reports have missing data including the illustration of the crash scenes which make
them faulty reports meaning they are not added to the database. He explained that if they
had a budget it would be easier to allocate cameras and CADs, which scan the ID and the
driver’s license and automatically input the data, to police trustees who report crash
scenes. This would make the process of data recording much more efficient and provide
video and photos evidence to the judge/insurance company documenting the crash scene
in the cases of arbitration or reimbursement.

6.2 Unsafe Roads and Mobility
This section explains the process of road designs and construction and documents the current
conditions of the road through a series of interviews and documented photos. The section is
divided into two sub sections which are the design and road construction. Under design the
Egyptian code for roads is explained, and the violations of the code are documented. Under
road construction the poor conditions of roads are documented and the disorganization in
road works stakeholders is discussed.
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6.2.1 Design
Egypt has issued a code for roads since 1998, and it consists of 10 books. Each book
is a detailed manual that mandates the steps required to execute its specialization. The code
consists of the following ten books; (1) Preliminary studies of roads; (2) Traffic Studies (3)
Engineering Design; (4) Road Materials and Tests; (5) Design and Construction of Bridges;
(6) Structural Design of Roads; (7) Surface and Groundwater Drainage of Roads; (8) Road
Construction Equipment; (9) Implementation requirements for road works inside and outside
cities; and (10) Road Maintenance (Egyptian Code for Roads, 2016)
However, the code is very general, it includes the definition of several integration and
separation concepts, but they are not as clear nor as defined like Vision Zero’s road
separation concepts which are explained in detail in the literature review chapter. Moreover,
not all of the concepts are mentioned as mandatory but mere suggestions. The engineering
design book discusses some concepts for protecting vulnerable road users and road
separation. For instance, section, 4-5 in the Egyptian code for roads explains the importance
of sidewalks in reducing pedestrian fatalities and injuries, while section, 4-8 defines the
bikeway and gives general suggestions on how it can be used in normal roads and on
highways, but neither their design nor their application are mentioned as mandatory in the
code. Section, 4-15 explains how traffic barriers shall be used to protect road users from
possible crashes, reduce the impact of the crash, and/or prevent vehicles from going off
course. As for whether the code is applied or not, a private engineering consultant explains
that it is not always present in real life applications in Egypt, noting:
Some roads and bridges in Egypt are perfectly designed and executed,
while others are death roads. We have some new dangerous bridges like
the one in Siddi Gabber [in Alexandria] which was recently opened. It has
several faulty designs and very sharp turns without proper barriers to
contain crash severity
(Private Consultant, personal communication, May 2018)
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He explains that there is an inconsistency in the quality of road designs and executions in
Egypt due to code violations in some cases. He gives an example of the dangerous design of
a new bridge in Alexandria which did not fully adhere to the Egyptian code for roads.
Violating the code has resulted in preventable traffic crashes on the bridge.
Vulnerable Road Users
A few pedestrian crossings with some traffic lights can be seen in very limited places
in Egypt, but there is no consistency in the road designs for pedestrian crossings. In many
cases speed humps3 are used for calming the speed of the in-coming traffic at locations with a
high volume of pedestrian crossings. Also, in some previously known blackspots where a lot
of pedestrians were killed a costlier alternative is used which is a pedestrian bridge.
New Cairo is a new urban city which was established with a presidential decree in
the year 2000 (New Urban Communities Authority, 2018). Yet, South 90 Street, the city’s
longest road, was designed without a single dedicated pedestrian crossing. In interviews with
MoI officials in the city, and an ambulance personnel stationed in New Cairo they stated that
per day they tend to one to three (1-3) pedestrian injuries in New Cairo. With the rise in the
number of pedestrian injuries the government has been adding more speed humps along the
road and is building a new pedestrian bridge at the beginning of the city as observed in the
recorded videos and photos since 2017.
Figures 32-35 (See Appendix A) show how pedestrians dangerously cross the roads in
New Cairo. The infrastructure of the city does not include a full pedestrian crossings design.
As for using sidewalks in their daily commutes, pedestrians to use them since they are
usually occupied by advertisement polls, street lights, trees, and/or road signs as shown in

3

A speed hump is wider and higher than a speed bump. Speed humps are commonly found on Egyptian roads,
while speed bumps are usually found in Egypt inside gated communities such as residential compounds.

66

figures 36 and 37 (See Appendix A). Hence, pedestrians end up walking among cars since
they cannot use the sidewalks.

6.2.2 Road Construction

The Egyptian General Authority for Roads, Bridges, and Land Transport which is
under the Ministry of Transport is the one responsible for overlooking the road works and
maintenance. During the interviews with government officials most of them indicated that the
reasons behind the code violations are either due to budget cuts due to the lack of funding, or
in some other cases it is the absence of monitoring and evaluation. For instance, one official
indicated that speed humps, which are widely used in Egypt as an alternative to pedestrian
crossings, are usually installed by workers in the absence of knowledgeable engineers and
therefore are not installed according to standards, and in some cases are illegally installed
without a permit by residents who aim to reduce the speed around their residential area.
Moreover, he indicated that the paint used to label speed humps is a cheap type of paint
which is usually used for doors not the paint used for marking the road because the original
paint is costly. The cheap paint fades quickly due to the friction with car tires and the ease of
its absorption by the asphalt. Figure 38 (See Appendix A) shows a speed hump which was
constructed in the summer of 2018, and only a couple of months later its paint almost
completely wore off while the paint stayed in perfect condition around the edge of the side
walk where there is no car tires friction. This is due to the use of lacquer paint, which is used
for doors and walls, instead of the specialized thermoplastic road marking paint which could
with stand tires friction. The lacquer pain is frequently used instead due to its much lower
cost compared to the high cost of the thermoplastic road marking paint (Senior MoI official,
personal communication, October 2017).
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Figures 39-41 (See Appendix A) show a Member of the Parliament (MP) lifting parts
of a newly paved road in ALBehera governorate using only his bare hands. These images
were taken from dmc TV’s morning show 8 am hosted by Ramy Radwan who mentioned that
the road has been only paved for 8 days prior to these images (Radwan, 2018). The MP
recorded a video to reflect on the amount of road works corruption in the absence of adequate
monitoring and evaluation. The road works contractor did not carry the basic codes and
measures of road pavements.
Furthermore, the problem of poor enforcement negatively affects the condtions of the
of roads in Egypt. A study (Bekheet, 2014) indicated that in recent years in Alexandira there
has been a noticable premature failure in roads within only 3-5 years of their consturction.
The study explained that in recent years there has been an increase in illegally building speed
humps without obtaining permits which has resulted in negatively affecting the roads. In
addition to the speed humps an engineering consultant explained that the overloaded trucks as
the ones displayed in the figures above, play a big role in destroying the roads in Egypt,
especially in new cities where consturction is an ongoing activity. He notes:
Constructing new roads and maintaining old ones in in the absence of law
enforcement is like throwing away your money in the Nile. These
overloaded trucks will destroy the roads soon after they are finished.
(private engineering consultant, personal communication, January 2018)

He explains that the road conditions are directly correlated with traffic law enforcement. If
traffic law does not exist there is no point in spending money on paving roads because the
roads will shortly be destroyed by the overloaded trucks.

Maintenance
The absence of leadership in the road safety management has resulted in the lack of
coordination among government bodies in multisectoral and intersectoral activities like road
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works. The activities that fall under road works are not aligned among different government
bodies and result in poor road conditions that need frequent maintenance. A private
engineering consultant highlights the matter noting:
Who is responsible for the conditions of the road? If we breakdown the
government bodies involved in road works, people will understand that the
biggest enemy of the road is the lack of coordination among government
bodies […] Road maintenance is a waste of money if there is no
coordination among government stakeholders.
(Private engineering consultant, personal communication, January 2018)

The consultant breaks down the parties involved in road works by explaining that officially
the Ministry of Transportation’s Roads and Bridges Authority is responsible for paving the
roads and road maintenance, and the local government is also involved. While, the Ministry
of Communications and Information Technology is responsible for extending landlines and
the internet’s fiber optics cables in the ground. As for the Ministry of Housing, Utilities &
Urban Communities it is responsible for the pipes for fresh water and waste water also in the
ground. The Ministry of Electricity is responsible for the underground electricity networks as
well. In addition to the Ministry of Petroleum who is responsible for extending underground
gas lines. Hence, if all these road work activities including placement and maintenance are
not aligned all together in a reasonable schedule the newly paved roads will continue to be
damaged after their maintenance, which is the case in Egypt. The lack of coordination does
not only result in the poor conditions of Egyptian roads, but it is a waste of the huge road
maintenance budget.
Figures 40 and 41 (See Appendix A) document the road maintenance of North 90
Street road in New Cairo in April 2018. Figure 42 (See Appendix A) shows the result of the
newly paved and maintained North 90 Street in August 2018. While figures 42-47 (See
Appendix A) show how this newly paved road was shortly destroyed after in October 2018.
New underground pipes were installed after the road was paved not before it. This reflects the
magnitude of the government waste of resources and the money lost due to the lack of
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coordination among government stakeholders. Other roads in New Cairo were observed and
they were also damaged shortly after their maintenance when fiber optics cables were
extended.
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6.3 Dangerous Vehicles
The World Forum for Harmonization for Vehicle Regulations (WP.29) is a worldwide
regulatory forum to the automotive sector and administrates three multilateral UN agreements
for technical prescriptions and specifications for wheeled vehicles, equipment and parts
which can be fitted and/or be used on wheeled vehicles. However, in developing countries
consumers are very price sensitive, and there are no stringent safety vehicle laws like the
ones set in the developed countries. Hence, many car manufacturers targeting markets in the
developing countries do not add similar safety features to the European ones for example
(BS, 2014).
Although Egypt is contracted to one of the three UN Vehicle Regulations
Agreements, Egypt does not have a clear mandate for vehicle safety standards in place
(Glukhenkiy, 2017). For example, many of the vehicles on the road and even the newly
manufactured vehicles sold in the Egyptian market lack main safety features. Vehicle
suppliers import cars without these basic safety features in order to have an attractive market
price. There are no laws restricting them from importing cars without ABS or even airbags.
Tables 5-7 show the car specifications of some of the most recent 2019 car models available
in the Egyptian market. These models lack fundamental vehicle safety standards such as
airbags for drivers, airbags for front passengers, and/or ABS Brake Systems.
Table 5: Chevrolet Lanos 2019

Specs

M/T F/O 1.5

Gear

Manual

Type

Sedan

Engine power (Horse Power/ roll/min)

86/5800

Airbags for driver

No

Airbags for front passenger

No
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ABS Brake System

No

Source: Contact Cars Egypt, 2019
Table 6: Cherry Envy 2019

Specs

M/T Tinted Glass 1.5

Gear

Manual

Type

Sedan

Engine power (Horse Power/ roll/min)

109/6000

Airbags for driver

No

Airbags for front passenger

No

ABS Brake System

Yes

Source: Contact Cars Egypt, 2019
Table 7: Hyundai Verna 2019

Specs

M/T GL 1.6

Gear

Manual

Type

Sedan

Engine power (Horse Power/ roll/min)

106/5800

Airbags for driver

No

Airbags for front passenger

No

ABS Brake System

No

Source: Contact Cars Egypt, 2019
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6.4 Unsafe Road Users Behavior
This section discusses the current violations of the road users which put them and
others at a high risk of injury. Moreover, it explores why Egypt has lenient sentences for
killer drivers in the Egyptian law.

6.4.1 Speed
Speeding is a common phenomenon on Egyptian roads, it has a strong cultural
presence. For instance, a common practice associated with Egyptian weddings is called Cars
Zaffa, where a fleet of cars surrounds the car of the bride and groom and practice several
speeding stunts on busy roads. Cars Zaffas claimed the lives of several Egyptians like the
three young medical students in 2016 when a young reckless Car Zaffa driver ran the three
girls over killing them all (Alhosary, 2016). There are many catastrophes related to Cars
Zaffas in Egypt, yet this practice is not criminalized by law. The act of speeding is, but the
dangerous act of speeding by a fleet of cars intentionally performing Cars Zaffas speeding
stunts is not particularly criminalized. Hence, any death caused by the dangerous voluntary
speeding associated with this act is ruled as an unintentional mistake ie. an accident, which
has a lenient involuntary manslaughter sentence.
Moreover, the act of car racing is commonly seen on Egyptian roads, yet it is also not
particularly criminalized in the Egyptian law, only the act of speeding is. In 2016 a
catastrophic car racing crash resulted in the death and injury of 15 young people in
Heliopolis, Cairo. A racing car spun out of control crashing into pedestrians and vulnerable
road users surrounding the area of the crash scene. The driver was excessively speeding
which resulted in a severe crash to the extent that some of the victims’ bodies were
decapitated in the aftermath which was aired on Dream TV channel (El-Ebrashy, 2016). In
2017 AUC lost one of its most beloved students, Nour Anwar, when an underaged and
unlicensed driver killed Nour a few km away from AUC when he was car racing with other
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cars on South 90 Street in New Cairo. His speeding resulted in his car flying and landing on
top of the car she was a passenger in. The car transporting Nour was severely damaged after
the crash (Sobhy, 2017). Nour lost her life because of a selfish act of a reckless racing
unlicensed driver yet the Egyptian law treats all killer drivers as involuntary killers, and their
acts as mere accidents. The lenient sentences of killer drivers can be as low as 6 months with
a sentence suspension.

6.4.2 Seatbelts, child-restraints, and helmets
The practice of wearing a seatbelt while driving in Egypt is uncommon, while child
restrains is nearly an inexistent practice except among a few. A study carried on three major
roads in Egypt showed the majority of drivers and front seat passengers did not wear seatbelts
(Hoe et al., 2013). The study also showed a low child restraint range of 1.1-3.9%. Another
study surveyed 486 families of injured children admitted to the emergency department at a
hospital in Ismailia showed that only 2.7% of them used seatbelts, and only 0.8% used child
restraints (El-Sayed et al,. 2012). A crash victim interviewee explained that most of her
friends do not use car seats for their children, and the children include newborns who are
usually seated on the lap of the mother or another occupant while in the car. She was
involved in a serious crash accident since she has been keen to put her newborn baby in a car
seat. However, she explains that not everyone does that and recalls the loss of her colleague’s
toddler in a crash, noting:
I always use a car seat for my son, because one of my work collogues lost
her unrestrained one-and-a-half-year-old baby boy in a crash on the ring
road. His body flew out of the car upon impact. Yet, most of my friends
don’t use car seats for their babies, and they don’t even know how they are
fixated in the car. They don’t even use seatbelts for the older ones
[children].
(A crash victim, personal communication, July 2017)

She explains that the majority of her friends with children don’t use car seats, and they don’t
even know how one is installed. When she rides with them in their cars and brings her baby’s
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car seat, they don’t know how to strap the seatbelt around it. When she was asked about
whether they can afford a car seat she answered:
Of course, they can afford buying one, I am talking about people from a
good financial and social level. Money is not the issue; it is just
uncommon here in Egypt to restraint children. People don’t realize its
importance.
(A crash victim, personal communication, July 2017)

She argues that buying and using a car seat is not correlated with financial nor social status. It
is only an uncommon practice in Egypt due to the lack of awareness in the society. People
don’t appreciate the importance of car seats in keeping their children safe.
During field observations a small number of private cars were noticed to use car seats
for their children while the majority did not; moreover, some baby car seats were found to be
placed dangerously in the passenger’s seat next to the driving mother on several occasions.
Some other children were seated on the lap of the drivers and front seat passengers. The
majority of the observed vehicles with children did not adhere to the standards of child
passenger safety such as car seats, seatbelts and helmets. In addition, some children were
placed in dangerous positions as seen in figures 42-46 (See Appendix A)

Egypt has witnessed a series of tragic deaths of school children during their
school commute. The recent tragedy of Malika, a 3-year-old child who was run
over by her school bus upon being dropped off to her house has caused a wide
debate on social media platforms. Her parents shared the footage obtained from
a camera in their neighborhood showing how the small child was left alone to
exit the bus and because she was tiny she did not show in the blind spot in the
right front corner of the bus when the driver ran her over (Samir, 2019). Malika’s
story got a wide coverage on social media because of the video; however, there
are several other stories in Egypt involving the death of young school children
underneath their school buses which are reported in Egyptian newspapers.
Moreover, the injury of 60 school children from which 47 have died in 2012
when their school bus was crushed by a train shook the Egyptian society (Talaat,
2012). However, very little action was taken ever since to monitor the state of
the bus drivers, the school bus routes, and maintain the needed measures of road
safety for school children.
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As for adults the number of adults using seatbelts or helmets were also very small.
The act of loading humans on the back of opened vehicles such as pickup trucks and tricycles
was frequently observed, especially among the lower social and economic class in Egypt. It
was also particularly high among construction workers, but it was also observed among
traffic police guards as shown in figures 47-51 (See Appendix A).

6.4.3 Driving Under the Influence

The Minister of Social Solidarity, Ghada Wally, highlighted the serious problem of
substance abuse in Egypt in several televised interviews stating that it is double the global
average (CBC, 2018). No academic research on the relationship between road fatalities and
injuries in Egypt and driving under the influence have been found, nor was there any
published statistics on the subject, yet there are some common indicators showing that there
is a prominent substance abuse problem among truck drivers involved in fatal crashes. In
2013, a drugged truck driver claimed the lives of 8 students, their principal and their bus
driver when he crashed into them on the Ring Road. In 2014, a crash claimed the lives of 18
school students whose bodies were burned in the collision flames due to a drugged truck
driver who crashed into their school bus in ElBehera governorate (AlWaqie, 2014). In 2016,
a drugged driver killed the daughter of one of this research interviewees after crashing into
their car. Hence in a bid to understand why drugs are prevailing among truck drivers an
interview with a truck driver was conducted. He explained that due to the long working hours
many truck drivers take drugs to stay awake. He does not take any drugs, but he worries that
he would fall asleep while driving someday:
“My job entails that I drive back and forth for long hours and I am a
human being who needs to rest… There are rest stops for trucks on the
highways, but they are completely disserted, and several drivers have been
mugged when they stopped there to rest/sleep. When I rest on the side of a
busy lit highway spot at night to avoid being mugged, police officers fined
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me, and I got in trouble. I don’t want to take drugs and I don’t do them,
but this is why many truck drivers take drugs. To stay awake, and work
longer hours without resting, and to make more money of course”
(A truck driver, personal communication, August 2017)

The driver explains that he is faced with the dilemma of either getting mugged at a rest stop,
getting fined if he pulls over on a busy lit highway to rest, or driving for long hours non-stop
even if he risks falling asleep while driving. He explains that some of the truck drivers solve
this dilemma by using drugs to keep them awake to work for longer hours without resting.
Driving for long hours without resting also means they can get more work done, which is
more profitable as he explains.
A MoI offical explains that in Egypt there is no system to regulate the service hours
of truck drivers. He benchmarks law enforcement tools in the EU, noting:
In the EU there are tachographs to monitor the hours driven and the speed
of truck drivers, and there are very strict laws. In Egypt there is no system
which we can use to monitor how many hours a truck driver has been
driving.
(MoI official, personal communication, September 2017)

A tachograph is a device which can be installed in the vehicle to record the driving, speed,
rest and break periods of the driver. Each driver has his own card which has all of his data,
the driver then inserts his tacho card when on work duty (Department for Transport, n.d.).
Since 2006 tachographs have been digitized and they include printers to print out detailed
receipts for road side inspections. It is mandatory in the EU to install a digital tachograph on
vehicles with a mass of 3.5 tons for goods transport, and for vehicles with more than 9
passengers including drivers for passenger transports (European Commission, n.d.).

Talk shows in the Egyptian media highlighted the problem of drugged truck drivers
for years because they have caused many tragic accidents, However, driving under the
influence isn’t just limited to truck drivers, but also smaller vehicles drivers such as
microbuses, taxis and private cars. A crash victim recalled when his car was hit by a drugged
microbus driver on 6 of October bridge in Cairo, stating:
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When I went down to check the damages, the microbus driver also went
out of his microbus. I was fuming, I could not even comprehend how he
hit my car. Then when I approached him, I noticed that he was in a
complete state of intoxication. His eyes were so red, and he couldn’t even
stand straight.
(A crash victim, personal communication, February 2018)

The crash victim went out of his car to check the crash damages caused by the microbus
driver to his car. He was very angry and he wanted to argue with the microbus driver because
the crash was completely avoidable. However, when he went to approach the microbus
driver, he discovered that he was in a complete state of intoxication to the extent that he
could not even stand up straight let alone drive a microbus on the longest bridge in Egypt, 6
of October bridge. Another crash victim explained the details of a crash which he
miraculously escaped. While he was driving on the ring road across a hotel, a large SUV
suddenly hit one of the side barricades and flipped multiple times and landed in the middle of
the ring road diagonally dangerously obstructing the traffic, when he rushed out of his car to
help the driver he noticed the following:
It was 2.30 am […] There was blood gushing out from his forehead, and
he wouldn’t even realize it. His breath was horrible, because he was
extremely drunk. When I asked him to unlock his phone and call a family
member, he could not even do it. Thank God nothing happened to me or
the other cars.
(Crash victim, personal communication, June 2017)

The crash victim was so close to crashing his car into the drunk SUV driver, but he luckily
was able to break along with the other cars on the road. The drunk driver was driving late at
night in a full state of intoxication. He could not even comprehend the harm his body endured
nor follow simple instructions such as dialing the number of a family member to come to his
aid.

6.4.4 Jaywalking
Many pedestrians in Egypt cross the roads dangerously due to the lack of adequate pedestrian
crossings. However, a crash victim explained in an interview that some pedestrians are
harmed because of jaywalking even if there are pedestrians crossing noting:
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When I was driving on Cairo-Alexandria highway I saw something in the
middle of the street I didn’t know what it was until I saw the body of a
dead young man in the middle of the highway. It was a horrific scene, he
died trying to cross the highway although there was a pedestrian bridge a
few meters away
(Crash victim, personal communication, 2018)

He recalls the horrific crash scene and indicates that the death of the young man could have
been avoided if he would have used the pedestrian bridge which was nearby. Figure 58 (See
Appendix A) shows two men on the left dangerously trying to cross Suez road right
underneath a pedestrian bridge, while a man in the top right is safely using the bridge to
cross. This is definitely a dangerous act; however, one of the interviewed engineering
consultants argued that the use of pedestrian bridges in Egypt is challenging to senior
pedestrians, mothers with strollers, people with knee injuries for example. Hence, elevators
and escalators should be installed for maximum effective use of pedestrian bridges.

6.4.5 Lenient Sentences for Killer Drivers
Some of the crash victims who lost their loved ones expressed their dissatisfaction of
the lenient killer drivers’ sentences in Egypt. They argued that lenient punishments would not
make drivers fear the consequences of traffic violations. The Egyptian law treats any motor
vehicle crash as a mistake, or what is more commonly referred to in the Egyptian context, an
accident, irrespective of the state of the killer driver. The sentence for killer drivers in the
Egyptian law is treated as involuntary manslaughter which can be as low as six months and a
one hundred Egyptian pounds as mandated in article 238 and 244 from the penal code (See
Appendix B).
A crash victim explained that in the case of her daughter’s death the judge was very
understanding and compassionate, but he could not give a serious sentence to her daughter’s
DUI killer because the law restricted him, she explains:
As long as he [killer driver] did not have a predetermination to kill my
daughter before leaving his house then this means that it was unintentional
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accident according to the Egyptian law, and he gets a minimum sentence
of involuntary manslaughter. Although he intentionally consumed drugs
and the tests proved it, he was speeding like a maniac with a heavy truck
on the ring road, and he intentionally hit us more than once to detach the
body of our car from his and escape. The judge was very decent, and he
wanted to help us but the law in front of him did not give him the space to
give the killer the sentence he deserved. The killer got only a three-year
sentence and a fine.
(A crash victim, personal communication, November 2017)

The judge was able to see the suffering of the mother and sympathize with her emotional
state after losing her daughter. However, the Egyptian penal code did not give the judge the
room to give the killer driver a serious sentence. According to the law if the killer driver did
not have a predetermined plan and intention to go down and kill that specific child by name
then the case is treated as involuntary manslaughter regardless of the predetermination of
substance abuse. Hence, the drugged and speeding killer truck driver got a lenient sentence
for killing a child.
There are two articles in the Egyptian law discussing involuntary manslaughter
specifically in the case of causing death by driving which is interpreted as causing death by
mistake. Articles 238 and 241of the Penal Code in the Egyptian law are as follows:

Article 238 of the Penal Code:

Whoever caused a mistake in the death of another person if that was due to negligence
or incompetence or lack of care or not to comply with laws, decrees, regulations and
regulations shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than six months
and a fine not exceeding two hundred pounds or one of these penalties. The penalty
shall be imprisonment for a period of not less than one year and not more than five
years and a fine not less than one hundred pounds and not exceeding five hundred
pounds or one of these two penalties if the crime is committed as a result of a serious
breach of the duty imposed by the offender on the basis of the job mandate or profession
or craft or if the perpetrator was under the influence of alcohol or drugs when the
mistake happened which has resulted in an accident or if the perpetrator did not provide
assistance while they can to the victims at the time of the accident. The penalty shall be
imprisonment for a period of not less than one year and not more than seven years if
the act results in the death of more than three persons. If there is another circumstance
mentioned in the preceding paragraph were satisfied, the penalty shall be imprisonment
for a period of not less than one year and not exceeding ten years.
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Article 244 of the Penal Code:

Whoever caused a mistake in injuring a person or injuring him if that was due to
negligence, recklessness, lack of care or failure to comply with the laws, decrees, rules
and regulations shall be liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year and
a fine not exceeding two hundred pounds. The penalty shall be imprisonment for a
period of not more than two years and a fine not exceeding three hundred pounds or
one of these penalties if the injury results in permanent disability or if the crime
occurred as a result of serious breach of duty by the offender as imposed by his job
mandate or profession or his craft or was drunk or drugged when they committed the
error which resulted in the incident or did not at the time of the incident help those the
crime were committed against given that the perpetrator had the ability to help. The
penalty shall be imprisonment if the crime results in the injury of more than three
persons. If there is another circumstance in the preceding paragraph, the penalty shall
be imprisonment for not less than one year and not more than five years

The Egyptian law under article 238 has named four offense leading to involuntary
manslaughter, which are: (1) negligence; (2) carelessness; (3) recklessness; and (4) nonobservance of laws and regulations; however, these four identified offenses still have the
same penalty range. Article 244 treats death by driving as an error, and if a killer driver was
proven to be drunk or drugged when they committed the error their penalty shall not be more
than two years imprisonment and a fine not exceeding three hundred pounds. If a killer driver
caused the death of more than three persons, then the penalty shall be imprisonment for not
less than one year and not more than five years.
Many leading countries in Road Safety have more stringent laws against DUIs and Speeding
and killer drivers.

To understand why Egypt has lenient killer drivers’ laws an interview was conducted with a
law professor. When asked about why the laws are that lenient, she explained:

The legal system simply does not trust the documentation of events which
could unjustly convict an innocent man. The law in Egypt prioritizes the
innocents over the felons. We have a serious problem in road safety
management and crash reports and law makers know that very well. What
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if people who honestly made a mistake while driving were unjustly
reported as drunk, drugged or speeding drivers. What if they did not even
make any mistakes and a pedestrian wrongly crossed the road for instance,
but the driver still gets falsely convicted. I am not saying the law is right
or wrong, but it prioritizes not convicting the perhaps innocent killer
drivers more than convicting the dangerous killer drivers.
(A law professor, personal communication, September 2018)

The professor explains that the law makers in Egypt do not believe in the poor road
management system conditions. They do not trust that the crash reports, which are manually
filled by some illiterate police trustees, to convict a killer driver. Hence the law does not
specify stringent sentences for killer drivers to avoid convicting innocent driver or drivers
who honestly made a mistake while not being under the influence or speeding. The law
makers give priority to the innocents when drafting the law over convicting the felons.
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6.5 Post-Crash Response
In case of the failure of the previous four pillars of road safety, the fifth pillar, postcrash response can still save a human life or decrease the severity of an injury. The literature
review covered the significance of a time sensitive response and the availability of trauma
centers in saving lives. Hence this section divides its findings into two subsections, ambulance
response and access to trauma care to explore the conditions of the current post-crash response
in Egypt.

6.5.1 Ambulance Response
An interview with crash victim survivor indicated that there is a problem in the
ambulance response, and medical professionality in handling the road injuries, noting:
My friend and I got into a horrible car crash on Road 90 in New Cairo. It
happened at 9.30 but the ambulance at 11am. We were in a critical
condition, my friend’s backbone was fractured, and she was completely
unconscious, while I sustained several fractured ribs and a punctured lung
[…]. Yet when the ambulance personnel arrived, they did not mind our
injuries and we were semi thrown on the stretchers.
(A crash victim, personal communication, July 2017)

She explains that she and her friend sustained serious injuries from the car crash and needed
immediate medical attention. The crash took place on a major road in New Cairo; however,
the ambulance response time was very long. Moreover, the ambulance workers were not
adequately trained to handle their critical condition.
To understand why an ambulance on a major road like 90 street would arrive an hour
late to a crash scene, an interview was conducted with an ambulance personnel in New Cairo
specifically. He highlighted a major problem in the ambulance service coverage, noting:
Our ambulance unit which is responsible for all the accidents that occur in
the area of Katameya also serves the whole stretch of road 90 in New
Cairo, because there isn’t a single ambulance unit on the 10+km stretch of
South 90 Street. So first it takes us awhile to get to the location, especially
if there is a rush hour. Second if there is more than one accident or a
medical emergency within this vast area to cover we get delayed, and it
does happen.
(An ambulance worker, personal communication, August 2017)
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According to the ambulance working the problem of the delay in the response time is related
to ambulance allocation. He explains that it is not right to have more than a ten kilometer
stretch of a major busy road like South 90 Street, and not have any ambulance units serving
it. The possibility of more than one accident or medical case that needs attention occurring
simultaneously can further affect the response time of the ambulance in New Cairo.

6.5.2 Access to Trauma Centers
In 2014, the government of the former Egyptian Prime Minister, Ibrahim Roshdy
Mahlab, issued a set of new laws and regulation binding hospitals to admit emergency
cases such as crash injuries. Previously, the law mandated a free emergency admission for
24 hours, but Mahlab’s new law extended it to 48 hours (See Appendix B). In return the
Ministry of Health is supposed to reimburse the hospitals (Eldemrany, 2014). However,
Eldemrany’s interviewee, Dr. Ahmed Hussein, member of the Board of the General
Union of Physicians, argued that this law is just ink on paper because the government
does not have the finances to payback the hospitals for the cost of these emergency
admissions.
Dr. Hussein doubt from 2014 were proved correct with time. There has been a wide
debate in the media and the society regarding the application of the 48 hours emergency law
after several reports of hospitals refusing to admit emergency patients. In some other cases
the hospitals would admit the patient to avoid legal problems and immediately release them
back irrespective of their medical condition to avoid the costs of their treatments. One of the
crash victims explains her experience with the ER at a public hospital noting:
After the ambulance admitted us to a public hospital, all the hospital did
was give my friend and I Voltaren, which numbed the pain and then they
immediately discharged us. They did not do any X-rays or anything.
Shortly after we were discharged the numbing was over and we suffered
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excruciating pain. When we were admitted to another hospital the doctors
did an X-ray to discover that my friend’s injury was a broken back and I
suffered several fractured ribs and a punctured lung. The doctors told us
that our injuries are probably worse because we moved around when we
were numbed with the Voltaren.
(A crash victim, personal communication, July 2017)

Voltaren shots are a strong pain relief treatment which numbs the pain resulting from an
injury but does not treat its cause. At the hospital where the ambulance dropped off the two
victims, they did not receive the necessary emergency treatments. The hospital avoided the
cost of their treatment through numbing their serious injuries to be able discharge them from
the hospital as quickly as possible. When they were later admitted to another hospital on their
families’ own expense, the hospital carried out all the required procedures to assess their
medical condition including X-rays. The X-rays showed that the two victims suffered from
serious injuries when, and one of the doctors indicated that perhaps their condition got worse
because they exerted a physical effort and moved around when their bodies were numbed by
the Voltaren which they took at the previous hospital.
Interviews with an ambulance worker, a private hospital manager, a government
official at the Ministry of Health were conducted to shed some insights on the current
conditions and investigate the ongoing problem of the 48 hours emergency law further.
An ambulance worker explained that within the area of his service there is a high
injury rate of nearly one to three crashes per day, many of which are usually critically injured
pedestrians trying to cross a five-lane highway to reach their workplaces. He adds that there
are no public hospitals near his deployment area and the private hospitals don’t usually
comply with the 48 hours law and refuse the entry of the ambulance inside the hospital,
noting:
There are no public hospitals within my area of service, so I have to drive
at least 15-20 km to reach the nearest public hospital that is equipped for
emergency cases… This can be very dangerous for the victims, especially
if they have a head injury. Within the 5 km geographical range of my
service there is only one hospital and it is private.
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(An ambulance worker, personal communication, October 2017)

The Minister of Health issued Decree No. 445 of 2014, on the executive rules of the Prime
Minister's Decree No. 1063 of 2014 to treat citizens in cases of emergency and injuries
during the first 48 hours free of charge, in all hospitals. Article no.4 of Decree No.455 of
2014 mandates that ambulance cars are obliged to transfer emergency cases to public
hospitals within five (5) kilometers from the geographical location of the accident first. In
case there were no public hospitals within the specified range, then the ambulance transfers
the emergency case to the nearest private hospital for emergency treatment. The ambulance
driver explained that there are no public hospitals within the specified five kilometers range
in his area of coverage. Yet private hospitals in his range refuse the admission of emergency
patients; hence, he usually has to transfer the emergency cases to a public hospital and the
nearest one to his area of service which is15-20 kilometers away. The ambulance driver
explained that in the city of New Cairo there are no available public trauma centers, hence if
any crash occurs the ambulance has to drive the victims to AL Bank AL Ahli hospital on the
Ring Road which is considerably a far distance if the injuries of the victims are critical. If the
victim is conscious and s/he has a medical insurance and can finance their admission to a
private hospital, then the ambulance can notify the private trauma center in New Cairo and
admit them.
A private hospital doctor argues that the 48 hours emergency law is inapplicable
because private hospitals will go bankrupt if they apply it noting:

When the law first came out, the private hospitals did not object and
complied with admitting emergency patients, but with the accumulation of
the unsettled bills, we realized that we will go bankrupt if we continue. For
example, we have had emergency admissions for crash victims under the
48 hours law, but some would stay in the ICU for more than a month not
just 48 hours. Most of the cases cannot afford to pay for their treatment
costs, and we cannot discharge ICU patients because once they are
admitted inside the hospital they become a legal responsibility if they die.
(A hospital manager, personal communication, January 2018)
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The private hospital manager explains that the accumulated unpaid bills has caused a deficit
in the budget of many private hospitals because the government did not reimburse them.
Some crash victims who sustained life threatening injuries had to be admitted to the Intensive
Care Unit for long durations not just 48 hours. He explained that once an emergency patient
is admitted inside the hospital, s/he become a legal responsibility and cannot transfer to other
hospitals before several weeks until their condition is stable. Also, Article 2 and Article 9
mandate that emergency patients should not be transferred from one hospital to another
before their condition is stable, and their transfer is approved by the central emergency and
local units. Hence the bill goes way beyond just 48 hours, given that many of these victims’
families are not financially capable, and there are no laws mandating that the government will
pay anything beyond the 48 hours. Not to mention, that there is a struggle to get reimbursed
for the 48 hours in the first place. Hence, private hospitals started turning ambulance cars
away. He explains that in some cases, hospitals try avoiding conflicts with the government,
so they accept emergency patients; however, they shortly dismiss them afterwards regardless
of their medical condition:

For instance, a road traffic crash victim can be suffering internal bleedingwhich is very serious, the hospital would just stich him/her up and dismiss
them without the needed tests, or X-rays to avoid high costs…. Now I am
talking about both private and public hospitals. Public hospitals also have
budgets, and many suffer from huge deficits, and they don’t usually get
reimbursed as well.
(A hospital manager, personal communication, January 2018)

The hospital manager explains that there are different ways to go about the 48 hours law.
Hospitals would not take the necessary emergency measures to properly diagnose the
admitted emergency cases. This disregard is usually done to avoid high costs, because the
government does not reimburse the hospitals irrespective of their nature, whether they are
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public or private hospitals. Such loopholes in the method of application result in the failure of
the 48 hours emergency law serving its purpose, which is saving the lives of emergency
cases.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion & Recommendations
The findings of this research show that none of the UN’s road safety five pillars are
successfully fulfilled in Egypt. A failure in the road safety management pillar seems to have
had a domino effect on all the other four pillars. Based on the identified challenges, a set of
Recommendations are drawn to enhance the road safety conditions in Egypt.

7.1 Conclusion
Government officials and private consultants, at key positions, have addressed the
problematic absence of a road safety lead agency to manage and overlook the entire process
of road safety in Egypt. Without this lead agency it is challenging to have a comprehensive
road safety strategy with defined objectives through the complex operational and
organizational structures of government stakeholders. Government stakeholders need to be
managed with a clear strategy and measurable targets to follow through. They also need to be
monitored and evaluated based on their performance and aligned on the same objectives since
the road safety activities are multisectoral and intersectoral.
Moreover, the absence of a road safety lead agency has resulted in the failure of the
execution of vital road safety activities, such as the addressed incomplete blackspots project
in one of the interviews. It has also resulted in government waste of resources, such as the
addressed halted projects and abandoned studies at the Ministry of Transportation, and the
example of the out of service traffic lights in the city of New Cairo which insinuated deep
corruption. The absence of a road safety lead agency has also resulted in the misallocation of
the government’s financial resources. There is a waste of the government resources on
incomplete, halted, abandoned and uncoordinated projects, while concurrently there is a lack
of funding problem across the traffic departments. In addition, the poor traffic law
enforcement due to deeply rooted challenges in the traffic departments in Egypt have resulted
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in alarming traffic violations such as the ones described by the interviewees and documented
in the field observations (See Appendix A). The problem of the absence of a lead agency is
cross cutting all the other four pillars.
For instance, there is a noticeable failure in the safe roads and mobility pillar, because
of the lack of coordination among the different authorities involved in road works. The roads
are either paved or maintained by the Ministry of Transportation, and damaged shortly after
due to disorganization in schedule activities by other ministries involved in road works such
as extending gas lines, fiber optics cables, water pipes maintenance, etc. Moreover, there is
an inconsistency in the quality of road designs and construction due to the poor monitoring
and evaluation of road works. The figures obtained from the Egyptian MP’s video lifting
parts of a newly constructed road with his bare hand show that there is a serious lack of
monitoring, evaluation, and accountability. All this result in dangerous roads, and
government waste of resources. As for venerable road users, the research findings show that
the fundamentals of road designs in Egypt are far from the road separation design concepts of
Sweden’s Vision Zero. Egypt not only does not have the separation concepts of venerable
road users, such as pedestrians, but does not have the coverage of basic pedestrian crossings.
For instance, a complete traffic lights system at pedestrian crossings is not integrated within
the country’s road designs.
As for the safe vehicles pillar, the research shows that Egypt does not have the basic
motor vehicle regulations such as airbags for drivers and front seat passengers. Moreover,
there are no regulations mandating ABS nor ESC breaking systems. Hence, in the absence of
such basic regulations, several motor vehicles suppliers supply the market with vehicles with
poor safety standards. They are able to capitalize on profit and focus on the price sensitive
market over providing fundamental vehicle safety features, which are more costly.
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Regarding the safe road users pillar, the research shows that there is a noticeable lack
of awareness among road users in Egypt. In the absence of road safety leadership there has
been an absence of nationwide awareness campaigns to educate road user. The lack of
awareness is not bound to specific financial or social class. Figures 48-52 (See Appendix A)
show unrestrained children who are dangerously positioned in vehicles. Some of the children
who are overloaded in the back of trucks, and motorcycles might reflect that the violations of
child passenger safety measures are only bound to a poor social class. However, the figures
show unrestrained and dangerously positioned children also in private cars. This reflects that
the lack of awareness is found across different financial and social levels in Egypt. Moreover,
the dangerous road user behavior shown in figure 25 also proves that there is a general lack
of awareness when it comes to traffic safety measures irrespective of the drivers’ financial
status. The figure shows a Volvo SUV, which has a market price range above 1 million
Egyptian pounds (Contact Cars, 2019), being driven in the opposite direction on a highway.
The car’s driver who could afford such an expensive car still lacked the sense of the
implications of the dangerous violation he was committing.
The five pillars are based on the safe system approach to provide a wide support
system to avoid the loss of life. Hence, in the case of failure of all the previous four pillars a
life can still be saved, and an injury can be reduced if the fifth pillar, post-crash response is
strong. Unfortunately, the research shows that the post-crash care system in Egypt faces
hindering challenges which impedes its performance. The absence of leadership among the
post-crash care stakeholders has also resulted in dangerous system failures. The problem of
the limited ambulance coverage and the lack of adequate training among ambulance
personals, were highlighted in the interviews. This shows that the process of saving a life or
treating a severe crash injury could be challenging in Egypt. The study shows that both the
ambulance and/or the trauma center systems face many challenges that hinder them from
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handling crash victims appropriately. The poor coverage of ambulances, the lack of adequate
training of ambulance personals, the loopholes in the 48 hours emergency law and the failure
of the Ministry of Health to compensate hospitals for their services place many crash victims
in life threatening situations where a preventable death or an avoidable long-term injury can
occur.

7.2 Recommendations
The failure in the pillars of road safety management, safe roads and mobility, safe
vehicles, safe road users, and the post-crash all have one trigger in common. That trigger is
the absence of a road safety leadership, which in return has a series of dangerous
reciprocating failures across the entire road safety system in Egypt. A national lead agency
with legislative powers and jurisdictions must be included in the Egyptian law. The national
lead agency shall have its own annual budget which should come from two sources. The first
source is the country’s national budget from which it will sustain its daily operations along
with the operations of the traffic department. The second source should be from the total sum
of the traffic tickets in Egypt which shall be allocated for the development of the operational
activities of the agency and the road safety stakeholders. The agency shall be held
accountable for the status of road safety in Egypt; hence, it needs a legislative authority to
hold the involved stakeholders accountable. It shall have a long-term strategy with short- and
long-term projects and activities. These projects and activities shall have clear objectives and
measurable targets. However, in order to have a strategy with clear objectives and measurable
targets, the agency needs to address the serious challenges found in this research.
Part of the crash data dilemma was a result of either the faulty crash reports reported
by the unskilled police trustees, and in other cases the inaction to report the crash as some of
the crash victims highlighted, hence the discrepancy in data between CAPMAS’s reported
crash injuries by the Ministry of Health versus the Ministry of Interior. Hence, the agency
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needs to supplement the traffic departments with more skilled traffic enforcement personals.
These skilled traffic enforcement personals can tend to crash scenes, regulate traffic on site,
and report parking violations. This recommendation is inspired from the UK’s Civil
Enforcement Officers (CEOs) program. CEOs are selected people from the general public
who receive training to become civil enforcement officers. Some of the work activities of the
CEO’s is to foot patrol the streets to ensure traffic regulations are being followed, record and
issue ticket fines, report on the road conditions if there are any damages, identify and report
stolen/ abandoned vehicles, work and coordinate with other police departments to report
observed criminal activities (CASCAID, 2019). They are usually equipped with handheld
CADs and printers to record and issue fines, two-way communicators to contact police
officers, and cameras to record violations (Medway Council, 2019).
In the Egyptian context, the CEOs can carry out some of the work activities as in the
UK and address to the specific challenges addressed in this study such as crash reports,
patrolling. CEO’s in Egypt can represent a more advanced visible traffic enforcement image
to the public to reflect on the status of the rule of law. However, this recommendation does
not eliminate the need of CCTV, and speed enforcement cameras in the 21st century in Egypt.
The finance of such projects can be obtained by the lead agency from the ticket fines to
further develop the tools of enforcement.
Moreover, the lead agency shall encourage road users to use public transport and
decrease the use of personal vehicles. This will decrease congestion and increase the use of
the 90% safer mode of transportation (public transport) compared to private transport
(Litman, 2016). In this case public transport means public buses, and metros and not
microbuses because they almost operate as private vehicles. However, in order to increase the
use of public transport the agency needs to collaborate with the Ministry of Transportation to
introduce new public transport projects with a wider coverage of good quality public
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transport in Egypt. Once the infrastructure and the format of these projects exist, private
investors will be more encouraged to join. Hence, the projects will be easily financed through
models such as Public Private Partnership (PPT) projects, or Build Operate Transfer (BOT)
projects which are found in several EU countries. Moreover, the agency needs to mandate
and ensure the application of motor vehicle safety regulations, and it shall be done in
coordination with the customs authority. The customs authority shall ensure that no new cars
with poor traffic safety measures are cleared. Customs and taxes reduction incentives on cars
with high safety features can also be used to motivate car dealers.
Egypt shall have safer road users through addressing the lack of awareness among all
road users, and the adequate training of novice drivers. Nationwide campaigns should be
carried out annually on the most visible marketing platforms such as billboard and on social
media. These campaigns should target Egypt’s most dominant problems in road safety
violations. For instance, in the UK studies have found a noticeable rise in road crash fatalities
and injuries particularly around the Christmas holiday season because of an increase in drunk
driving violations. Nearly two decades ago the country introduced a nationwide campaign
called THINK! Every year the campaign usually starts in December and ends on the 1st of Jan
of the following year. THINK! has decreased road deaths in the UK by 46% (Think, 2019).
Moreover, the Egyptian government should encourage the establishment of driving schools,
and the law shall mandate attending a driving school before obtaining a driving license. The
driving test centers should be monitored and evaluated to ensure that a driving license is only
obtained after passing all the necessary driving tests.
As for Egypt’s crash data, CAPMAS is a great source of data collection, the data
dilemma was not caused by CAPMAS, but by the sources from which CAPMAS had
obtained the data. Hence, after addressing the root causes of the under reported data, the
leady agency should collaborate with CAPMAS to observe crash trends from which it can
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draw campaign objectives. Once there are clear problems, and perhaps specific dates such as
in the example of the UK, the lead agency should launch road safety nationwide campaigns
with clear objectives and targets. Then with the help of CAPMAS and traffic departments it
can evaluate the effect of the recommended annual awareness campaigns.
Furthermore, the lead agency needs to collaborate with the Ministry of Education and
the Ministry of Higher Education to establish a specialized road safety department within
each ministry. Road Traffic injuries are the leading cause of death among children aged 5-14
(WHO, 2018). Children usually spend their time on the road commuting back and forth to
schools. The job of this department shall be focused on enhancing the level of student’s road
safety during their school/university commutes. Whether the students use school/university
buses, public transport, or private motor vehicles for their commute. The department should
play a positive role in saving their lives. Students should be educated in schools about road
safety measures. For the younger students their education can involve some road safety
activities to be carried with their parents to increase the level of awareness in their
households.
Moreover, the road safety department in collaboration with the lead agency and the
traffic department shall carry out drug tests among their bus drivers on regular basis.
Moreover, the bus areas and students pick up and drop off areas should have safety
regulations in all the schools and universities to ensure students safety. Yara’s death, a 19year-old student at the German University in 2015 has caused a university strike and a wide
anger among the students who noted that the bus driver who accidently killed Yara was not
the only one at fault but rather the university’s transport department which had poor safety
regulations (Allam, 2015). Similar death scenarios like Yara’s and the 3-year-old Malika
must be prevented.
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Finally, in order to save lives on the road from dangerous and/or reckless killer drivers all
road drivers must know that there are implications to their actions; hence, it is important to
hold killer drivers accountable. The interviewed law professor argued that the law makers in
Egypt did not create harsh killer driver laws because of the poor conditions of road safety
management and their mistrust in crash reports. Hence, the lead agency needs to first ensure
the rule of law, and the enhancement of crash reports through the suggested policy
recommendations, then it should immediately tend to adjust the killer driver laws in
cooperation with the Egyptian government and the parliament.
The UK can then be used as a benchmark for the new law adjustments, because the law
sentences for causing death by driving is categorized in more details in the British context
compared to the Egyptian context which identifies all killer drivers, irrespective of their
violation, as people who made a mistake. For example, The British Road Traffic Act 1988
has divided the offense of causing death by driving into four different offenses. They are as
follows; (1) causing death by dangerous driving; (2) causing death by careless driving while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs; (3) causing death by careless or inconsiderate
driving; and (4) causing death by driving: unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured drivers.
While in some cases carless and inconsiderate driving can be borderline with dangerous
driving, each offense is described differently. Dangerous driving can encompass multiple
offenses such as deliberately driving beyond the speed limit, consumption of large amounts
of alcohol and/or drugs to gross impairment, driving unmaintained vehicle, disregard to
vulnerable road users, and/or dangerous maneuvers. As for careless and inconsiderate
driving, the offenses can encompass short distractions, driving through a red light,
inappropriate overtaking, flashing lights, and or misuse of lanes. Dangerous driving has three
levels of seriousness with three difference sentencing ranges accordingly. Causing deaths by
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dangerous driving sentences and causing deaths under the influence can result in sentences up
to 14 years, while careless driving only has a maximum of 5 years (SGC, 2008)
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APPENDIX A (Figures):
Figure 1:Probability of Death vs. Impact Speed in km/h

Source: Pasanen, E. (1992)

Figure 2: Population increase in Egypt
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Figure 3: Number of Licensed Vehicles in Egypt
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Figure 4: Vehicles Crashes, and Crash Fatalities and Injuries
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Figure 5: An out of service Traffic Light in a roundabout in New Cairo

Source: ELMoghazi (2019)
Figure 6: An out of service traffic light

Source: ELMoghazi (2019)
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Figure 7: A traffic light’s pole

Source: ELMoghazi (2019)
Figure 8: A part of a broken traffic light pole

Source: ELMoghazi (2019)
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Figure 9: A child driving a loader on North 90 Street in New Cairo

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Two children around 10-12 years of age were observed playing with a heavy construction loader in broad day
light. A child driver was driving it forwards and reversing it backwards in the middle lane on North 90 Street. By
the time I U-turned and parked my car to document the incident they had stopped on the side to load the sidewalk’s
interlocks on the loader.
For Police reference this picture was taken exactly at 11:14 am, October 17, 2018 across Better Homes buildings
on North 90 street, New Cairo.

Figure 10: A child drives a tricycle against the direction of traffic

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 11: A dangerously loaded truck without license plates

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 12: A Truck without backlights nor a license plate

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 13: A dangerously overloaded truck

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 14: A dangerously loaded truck without license plates

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 15: A truck without license plates

Source: (ELMoghazi, 2018)
Figure 16: A car without license plates

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 17: A car without license plates

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 18: A car without license plates

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)

Figure 19: Two Motorbikes at a petrol station, one is without the license plates

Source: ELMoghazi (2019)
Figure 20: Different license plates format

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 21:Three cars and three license plates formats

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 22: Handwritten license plates

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 23: A poorly handwritten license plate

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 24: A handwritten license plate

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 25: A car driving in the opposite direction on New Cairo- Suez Highway

(Source:

ELMoghazi (2018)

Figure 26: A parent’s car parked in the middle lane across a school during pickup time (notice the mirrors)

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 27: A car occupying the disabled parking without a visible permit

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 28: The parking’s management reserve’s the disabled parking using barricades

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 29: A Police Officer and a Police Trustee

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 30: A pedestrian vulnerably crossing the road

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 31: A pedestrian vulnerably crossing a bridge

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 32: Pedestrians crossing in front of a speed hump with faded paint

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 33: A pedestrian running to cross a wide lane street

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 34: Across AUC the sidewalks are occupied with advertisement and light poles

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 35: Across AUC pedestrians are unable to use the occupied sidewalk

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 36: The wrongly used lacquer paint wears off quickly on the asphalt but not on the pavement sides where there is no
friction

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 37: The MP is trying to lift the asphalt with his barehand

Figure 38: The MP easily removed the asphalt

Figure 39: The MP holding pieces of the asphalt in his hands

Source : dmc tv (2018)
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Figure 40: Paving North 90 Street in April 2018

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 41: Road Works Machine and Truck on North 90 Street in April 2018

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 42: North 90 Street Newly Paved in August 2018

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 43: The Newly paved North 90 Street is being destroyed in October 2018

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 44: Underground Pipes are beging installed and the new asphalt is destroyed in October 2018

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 45: A closer look at the destruction of the newly paved North 90 road in October 2018

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 46: An underground pipe with construction supports. October 2018

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 47: More pipes were installed in October 2018 after North 90 Street in was paved. Notice the new destroyed asphalt

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 48: Unrestrained children in the back of a pickup truck

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 49: Unrestrained children in the back of a tricycle

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)

Figure 50: Dangerously seated children inside a car’s trunk

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)

Figure 51: Three school children and a driver are on one motorcycle none of them wearing helmets

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 52: A driver, four children and their school bags on one motorcycle

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
Figure 53: A distracted motorcyclist driving without a helmet and looking through his phone

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 54: Four men on one motorcycle, none of them is wearing a helmet

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)

Figure 55: A group of people are overloaded on a pickup truck

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 56: Traffic police guards are overloaded on the back of a towing truck

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)

Figure 57: Traffic police guards are overloaded on the back of a towing truck while receiving instructions

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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Figure 58: Jaywalkers Underneath a Pedestrian Bridge on a Highway

Source: ELMoghazi (2018)
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APPENDIX B (Attachments)


The UN’s Decade of Action for Road Safety 2010-2020 Conceptual Framework:

Pillar 1: Road safety management:
Adhere to and/or fully implement UN legal instruments and encourage the creation of regional road safety
instruments. Encourage the creation of multi-sectoral partnerships and designation of lead agencies with the
capacity to develop and lead the delivery of national road safety strategies, plans and targets, underpinned by the
data collection and evidential research to assess countermeasure design and monitor implementation and
effectiveness.
Activity 1: Adhere to and/or fully implement the major United Nations road safety related agreements and
conventions; and encourage the creation of new regional instruments similar to the European Agreement
concerning the Work of Crews of Vehicles engaged in International Road Transport (AETR), as required,
including:
• Convention on Road Traffic, of 8 November 1968, aiming at facilitating international road traffic and at increasing
road safety through the adoption of uniform road traffic rules;
• Convention on Road Signs and Signals, of 8 November 1968, setting up a set of commonly agreed road signs and
signals;
• AETR, of 1 July 1970, to be used as a model the creation of regional legal instruments.
Activity 2: Establish a lead agency (and associated coordination mechanisms) on road safety involving partners
from a range of sectors through:
• designating a lead agency and establishing related secretariat;
• encouraging the establishment of coordination groups; and
• developing core work programs.
Activity 3: Develop a national strategy (at a cabinet or ministerial level) coordinated by the lead agency
through:
• confirming long-term investment priorities;
• specifying agency responsibilities and accountabilities for development and implementation of core work programs;
• identifying implementation projects;
• building partnership coalitions;
• promoting road safety management initiatives such as the new ISO traffic safety management standard ISO 39001;
and
• establishing and maintaining the data collection systems necessary to provide baseline data and monitor progress in
reducing road traffic injuries and fatalities and other important indicators such as cost, etc.
Activity 4: Set realistic and long-term targets for national activities based on the analysis of national traffic
crash data through:
• identifying areas for performance improvements; and
• estimating potential performance gains.

Activity 5: Work to ensure that funding is sufficient for activities to be implemented through:
• building business cases for sustained funding based on the costs and benefits of proven investment performance;
• recommending core annual and medium-term budgetary targets;
• encouraging the establishment of procedures for the efficient and effective allocation of resources across safety
programs;
• utilizing 10% of infrastructure investments for road safety; and
• identifying and implementing innovative funding mechanisms.
Activity 6: Establish and support data systems for on-going monitoring and evaluation to include a number of
process and outcome measures, including:
• establishing and supporting national and local systems to measure and monitor road traffic deaths, injuries and
crashes;
• establishing and supporting national and local systems to measure and monitor intermediate outcomes, such as
average speed, helmet-wearing rates, seat-belt wearing rates, etc.;
• establishing and supporting national and local systems to measure and monitor outputs of road safety interventions;
• establishing and supporting national and local systems to measure and monitor the economic impact of road traffic
injuries; and
• establishing and supporting national and local systems to measure and monitor exposure to road traffic injuries.

Pillar 2: Safer roads and mobility
Raise the inherent safety and protective quality of road networks for the benefit of all road users, especially the
most vulnerable (e.g. pedestrians, bicyclists and motorcyclists). This will be achieved through the
implementation of various road infrastructure agreements under the UN framework, road infrastructure
assessment and improved safety-conscious planning, design, construction and operation of roads.
Activity 1: Promote road safety ownership and accountability among road authorities, road engineers and
urban planners by:
• encouraging governments and road authorities to set a target to “eliminate high risk roads by 2020”;
• encouraging road authorities to commit a minimum of 10% of road budgets to dedicated safer road infrastructure
programs;
• making road authorities legally responsible for improving road safety on their networks through cost-effective
measures and for reporting annually on the safety situation, trends and remedial work undertaken;
• establishing a specialist road safety or traffic unit to monitor and improve the safety of the road network:
• promoting the safe system approach and the role of self-explaining and forgiving road infrastructure;
• Adhere to and/or fully implement the regional road infrastructure Agreements developed under the auspices of the
United Nations regional commissions and encourage the creation of similar regional instruments, as required; and
• monitoring the safety performance of investments in road infrastructure by national road authorities, development
banks and other agencies.
Activity 2: Promoting the needs of all road users as part of sustainable urban planning, transport demand
management and land-use management by:
• planning land use to respond to the safe mobility needs of all, including travel demand management, access needs,
market requirements, geographic and demographic conditions;
• including safety impact assessments as part of all planning and development decisions; and
• putting effective access and development control procedures in place to prevent unsafe developments.
Activity 3: Promote safe operation, maintenance and improvement of existing road infrastructure by requiring
road authorities to:
• identify the number and location of deaths and injuries by road user type, and the key infrastructure factors that
influence risk for each user group;
• identify hazardous road locations or sections where excessive numbers or severity of crashes occur and take
corrective measures accordingly;
• conduct safety assessments of existing road infrastructure and implement proven engineering treatments to improve
safety performance;
• take a leadership role in relation to speed management and speed sensitive design and operation of the road network;
and ensure work zone safety.
Activity 4: Promote the development of safe new infrastructure that meets the mobility
and access needs of all users by encouraging relevant authorities to:
• take into consideration all modes of transport when building new infrastructure;
• set minimum safety ratings for new designs and road investments that ensure the safety needs of all road users are
included in the specification of new projects;
• use independent road safety impact assessment and safety audit findings in the planning, design, construction,
operation and maintenance of new road projects, and ensure the audit recommendations are duly implemented.
Activity 5: Encourage capacity building and knowledge transfer in safe infrastructure by:
• creating partnerships with development banks, national authorities, civil society, education providers and the private
sector to ensure safe infrastructure design principles are well understood and applied;
• promoting road safety training and education in low-cost safety engineering, safety auditing and road assessment;
and
• developing and promoting standards for safe road design and operation that recognize and integrate with human
factors and vehicle design.
Activity 6: Encourage research and development in safer roads and mobility by:
• completing and sharing research on the business case for safer road infrastructure and the investment levels needed
to meet the Decade of Action targets;
• promoting research and development into infrastructure safety improvements for road networks in low-income and
middle-income countries; and
• promoting demonstration projects to evaluate safety improvement innovations, especially for vulnerable road users.
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Pillar 3: Safer vehicles
Encourage universal deployment of improved vehicle safety technologies for both passive and active safety
through a combination of harmonization of relevant global standards, consumer information schemes and
incentives to accelerate the uptake of new technologies.
Activity 1: Encourage Member States to apply and promulgate motor vehicle safety regulations as developed
by the United Nation’s World Forum for the Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP 29).
Activity 2: Encourage implementation of new car assessment programs in all regions of the world in order to
increase the availability of consumer information about the safety performance of motor vehicles.
Activity 3: Encourage agreement to ensure that all new motor vehicles are equipped with seat-belts and
anchorages that meet regulatory requirements and pass applicable crash test standards (as minimum safety
features).
Activity 4: Encourage universal deployment of crash avoidance technologies with proven effectiveness such as
Electronic Stability Control and Anti-Lock Braking Systems in motor vehicles.
Activity 5: Encourage the use of fiscal and other incentives for motor vehicles that provide high levels of road
user protection and discourage import and export of new or used cars that have reduced safety standards.
Activity 6: Encourage application of pedestrian protection regulations and increased research into safety
technologies designed to reduce risks to vulnerable road users.
Activity 7: Encourage managers of governments and private sector fleets to purchase, operate and maintain
vehicles that offer advanced safety technologies and high levels of occupant protection.

Pillar 4: Safer road users
Develop comprehensive programs to improve road user behavior. Sustained or increased enforcement of laws
and standards, combined with public awareness/education to increase seat-belt and helmet wearing rates, and to
reduce drink-driving, speed and other risk factors.
Activity 1: Increase awareness of road safety risk factors and prevention measures and implement social
marketing campaigns to help influence attitudes and opinions on the need for road safety programs.
Activity 2: Set and seek compliance with speed limits and evidence-based standards and rules to reduce
speed-related crashes and injuries.
Activity 3: Set and seek compliance with drink–driving laws and evidence-based standards and rules to
reduce alcohol-related crashes and injuries.
Activity 4: Set and seek compliance with laws and evidence-based standards and rules for motorcycle helmets
to reduce head-injuries.
Activity 5: Set and seek compliance with laws and evidence-based standards and rules for seat-belts and child
restraints to reduce crash injuries.
Activity 6: Set and seek compliance with transport, occupational health and safety laws, standards and rules
for safe operation of commercial freight and transport vehicles, passenger road transport services and other
public and private vehicle fleets to reduce crash injuries.
Activity 7: Research, develop and promote comprehensive policies and practices to reduce work-related road
traffic injuries in the public, private and informal sectors, in support of internationally recognized standards
for road safety management systems and occupational health and safety.
Activity 8: Promote establishment of Graduated Driver Licensing systems for novice drivers.
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Pillar 5: Post crash response
Increase responsiveness to post-crash emergencies and improve the ability of health and other systems to
provide appropriate emergency treatment and longer-term rehabilitation for crash victims.
Activity 1: Develop prehospital care systems, including the extraction of a victim from a vehicle after a crash,
and implementation of a single nationwide telephone number for emergencies, through the implementation of
existing good practices.
Activity 2: Develop hospital trauma care systems and evaluate the quality of care through the implementation
of good practices on trauma care systems and quality assurance.
Activity 3: Provide early rehabilitation and support to injured patients and those bereaved by road traffic
crashes, to minimize both physical and psychological trauma.
Activity 4: Encourage the establishment of appropriate road user insurance schemes to finance rehabilitation
services for crash victims through:
• Introduction of mandatory third-party liability; and
• International mutual recognition of insurance, e.g. green card system.
Activity 5: Encourage a thorough investigation into the crash and the application of an effective legal
response to road deaths and injuries and therefore encourage fair settlements and justice for the bereaved
and injuries.
Activity 6: Provide encouragement and incentives for employers to hire and retain people with disabilities.
Activity 7: Encourage research and development into improving post-crash response.
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Egypt’s Data: The Global Status Report on Road Safety 2015
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 Egypt’s Data: The Global Status Report on Road Safety 2009
DISCLAIMER: THIS STUDY DISAPPROVES THE FOLLOWING MAP OF EGYPT BECAUSE
EGYPT’S MAP INCLUDE HALAYB AND SHALATEEN WHICH ARE PART OF THE EGYPTIAN
TERRETORIES AND SOVEREIGNTY.
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 Articles from the Egyptian law
: من قانون العقوبات باآلتي238 تنص المادة
من تسبب خطا في موت شخص اخر بان كان ذلك ناشئا عن اهماله او رعونته او عدم احترازه او عدم مراعاته للقوانين والقرارات
 واللوائح واالنظمة يعاقب بالحبس مدة ال تقل عن ستة اشهر وبغرامة ال تجاوز مائتي جنية او بإحدى هاتين العقوبتين.
وتكون العقوبة الحبس مدة ال تقل عن سنة وال تزيد علي خمس سنين وغرامة ال تقل عن مائة وال تجاوز خمسمائة جنيه او بإحدى
هاتين العقوبتين اذا وقعت الجريمة نتيجة اخالل الجاني اخالال جسيما بما تفرضه عليه اصول وظيفته او مهنته او حرفته او كان
متعاطيا مسكرا او مخدرا عند ارتكابه الخطأ الذي نجم عنه الحادث او نكل وقت الحادث عن مساعدة من وقعت عليه الجريمة او عن
 طلب المساعدة له مع تمكنه من ذلك.
وتكون العقوبة الحبس مدة ال تقل عن سنة وال تزيد علي سبع سنين اذا نشأ عن الفعل وفاة اكثر من ثالثة اشخاص فاذا توافر ظرف
 اخر من الظروف الواردة في الفقرة السابقة كانت العقوبة بالحبس مدة ال تقل عن سنة وال تزيد علي عشر سنين.
Translation of Article 238 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
Whoever caused a mistake in the death of another person if that was due to negligence or
incompetence or lack of care or not to comply with laws, decrees, regulations and regulations shall be
punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than six months and a fine not exceeding two
hundred pounds or one of these penalties.
The penalty shall be imprisonment for a period of not less than one year and not more than five
years and a fine not less than one hundred pounds and not exceeding five hundred pounds or one of
these two penalties if the crime is committed as a result of a serious breach of the duty imposed by
the offender on the basis of the job mandate or profession or craft or if the perpetrator was under the
influence of alcohol or drugs when the mistake happened which has resulted in an accident or if the
preparator did not provide assistance while they can to the victims at the time of the accident.
The penalty shall be imprisonment for a period of not less than one year and not more than seven
years if the act results in the death of more than three persons. If there is another circumstance
mentioned in the preceding paragraph were satisfied, the penalty shall be imprisonment for a period
of not less than one year and not exceeding ten years.

: من قانون العقوبات باآلتي244 كما تجرى المادة
من تسبب خطا في جرح شخص او ايذائه بان كان ذلك ناشئا عن اهماله او رعونته او عدم احترازه او عدم مراعاته للقوانين
والقرارات واللوائـح واالنظمة يعاقب بالحبس مدة ال تزيد على سنة وبغرامة "ال تجاوز مائتي جنيه" او بإحدى هاتين العقوبتين.
وتكون العقوبة الحبس مدة ال تزيد على سنتين وغرامة ال تجاوز ثالثمائة جنيه او احدى هاتين العقوبتين اذا نشا عن االصابة عاهة
مستديمة او اذا وقعت الجريمة نتيجة اخالل الجاني اخالال جسيما بما تفرضه عليه اصول وظيفته او مهنته او حرفته او كان متعاطيا
مسكرا او مخدرا عند ارتكابه الخطأ الذى نجم عنه الحادث او نكل وقت الحادث عن مساعدة من وقعت عليه الجريمة او عن طلب
 المساعدة له مع تمكنه من ذلك.
 فاذا توافر ظرف اخر من الظروف الواردة في الفقرة، وتكون العقوبة الحبس اذا نشا عن الجريمة اصابة اكثر من ثالثة اشخاص
السابقة تكون العقوبة الحبس مدة ال تقل عن سنة وال تزيد على خمس سنين
Translation of Article 244 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
Whoever caused a mistake in injuring a person or injuring him if that was due to negligence,
recklessness, lack of care or failure to comply with the laws, decrees, rules and regulations shall be
liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding two hundred
pounds.
The penalty shall be imprisonment for a period of not more than two years and a fine not
exceeding three hundred pounds or one of these penalties if the injury results in permanent disability
or if the crime occurred as a result of serious breach of duty by the offender as imposed by his job
mandate or profession or his craft or was drunk or drugged when they committed the error which
resulted in the incident or did not at the time of the incident help those the crime were committed
against given that the preparator had the ability to help.
The penalty shall be imprisonment if the crime results in the injury of more than three persons. If
there is another circumstance in the preceding paragraph, the penalty shall be imprisonment for not
less than one year and not more than five years
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The Contents of the 48 hours emergency law has been translated from the following official
document which was issued in 2014 by the Egyptian Prime Minister:
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